Introduction
Central banks are not merely government offices, but "priests of prosperity." This article analyzes how modern central banking has fostered a quasi-religious culture where legitimacy rests on a belief in competence shielded by hermetic language. You will learn why the transplantation of Western models to post-communist countries created a "wormhole network" and how the 2008 crisis led to the birth of financial nationalism. Understanding these mechanisms is crucial for assessing the stability of the contemporary economic order and the future of global business.
Priests of Prosperity and the Norm Transfer Mechanism
Juliet Johnson describes bankers as priests of prosperity—custodians of rituals and a hermetic code that functions like medieval Latin. The wormhole network mechanism allows national elites to connect directly with global professional hubs, such as Basel, while completely bypassing local public opinion. This model rests on two pillars: price stability and political independence, which in the 1990s rose to the status of dogmas of credibility.
The process of transplanting this model involves three stages: political choice, institutional transformation, and the most difficult—internalization—embedding the new logic into the social consciousness. Failure in this final stage gives rise to the "sins of transformation." The sin of excess is the elevation of independence to the level of isolation from the rest of the state, while the sin of omission is an obsession with inflation coupled with the neglect of the financial stability of the entire system.
The 2008 Crisis and the Birth of Financial Nationalism
The 2008 crisis shattered the myth of technocratic infallibility, exposing the political dimension of their actions. This paved the way for financial nationalism—a strategy that uses monetary tools to promote national interests in opposition to global dogmas. The case of Hungary illustrates this transition: from a model neophyte to "apostasy," where the central bank became a tool for supporting national champions (so-called repurposing).
Different trajectories are visible in the Czech Republic and Slovakia: Prague focused on technocratic efficiency, while Bratislava used the euro as an external shield of credibility. Meanwhile, Russia negotiated its position in the global network from a stance of imperial power, and Kyrgyzstan remained a "potted garden"—creating a modern institution that, lacking social roots, became a politically powerless scapegoat.
Independence vs. Accountability: A New Risk Map
The contemporary dilemma of banking is the aporia between independence and accountability. In an era of polarization, a bank's operational autonomy is at risk if it is not accompanied by an understandable language for justifying decisions. The solution may be a constitution of credibility—a new mandate in which the central bank steps out of the shadow of technocracy and subjects its goals to public debate to avoid accusations of usurpation.
For global business, this means a hybridization of models. The world will split into zones of hard independence and areas where money is a tool of state policy. The institutional risk premium will depend on whether a central bank can build social recognition or hides behind jargon. The stability of the rules of the game will become more important than interest rates themselves.
Summary
A priest who hides a ritual behind a veil of technocratic jargon risks being accused of witchcraft. In the coming order, the winner will not be the most orthodox central bank, but the one capable of building resilience against delegitimization through the transparent justification of its decisions. Should the power over money remain the domain of procedures, or should it be subject to democratic control to avoid a revolt of the sovereign? The answer to this question will define the financial stability of the coming decade.
📄 Full analysis available in PDF