Introduction
The phenomenon of Arab clans in Germany is not the result of genetic or religious factors, but rather the outcome of years of systemic failures. They emerged in places where the state abandoned law enforcement in favor of superficial tolerance. This article analyzes how a parallel society grew out of flawed migration policies and why Poland must learn from this lesson before facing a similar challenge. You will discover how the mechanism of isolation and the capital of fear led to the paralysis of public institutions in the heart of Europe.
The Lebanese Civil War and Duldung status: the origins of isolation
The roots of clan structures date back to the wave of refugees from Lebanon in the late 1980s. A key mistake proved to be the Duldung status (tolerated stay), which kept migrants in legal limbo. These individuals, formally required to leave but effectively remaining in Germany, were subject to a work ban. This forced inactivity confined them to ghettos, where their only support became the clan rather than the state.
Importantly, Polish migration from the same period did not produce clan structures. Despite working illegally, Poles did not have endogamy or a clan-based legal system in their cultural DNA. Their criminal groups were ephemeral gangs based on a leader's charisma rather than blood ties, which facilitated later assimilation. In the case of Arab clans, the lack of the right to work and isolation became the foundation for building hermetic, multi-generational criminal dynasties.
Paralleljustiz and the capital of fear: when the clan displaces the law
In districts like Berlin's Neukölln, Paralleljustiz—a parallel justice system—operates. Disputes within the community are resolved by peace judges (Friedensrichter), who apply a code of honor instead of the criminal code. Verdicts are based on retaliation or Blutgeld (blood money), causing victims to withdraw testimony and witnesses to suffer from collective amnesia. In this way, the state loses its monopoly on justice.
This phenomenon generates a powerful capital of fear that paralyzes local officials and entrepreneurs. A clan name acts as both currency and immunity—building officials were afraid to order the demolition of Issa Rammo's illegal garden house without the assistance of anti-terrorist units. The education crisis exacerbates this problem: in schools, the street wins the battle for authority. Clan youth more frequently ask teachers: "Do you know who my uncle is?", prioritizing loyalty to the clan over the state's value system.
From the Big Maple Leaf theft to the strategy of a thousand stings
Spectacular thefts, such as the removal of the 100-kilogram Big Maple Leaf gold coin from the Bode Museum or the break-in at the Dresden vault, have become symbols of the Rammo clan's audacity. Clan finances rely on the real estate market, where dirty money from extortion and drugs is laundered. Clan women play a key role here—often serving as "straw buyers," purchasing homes with cash, as their clean records are less likely to attract police attention. Another lucrative method is the fake policeman scam, coordinated from Turkish call centers, targeting the savings of seniors.
In response, Germany implemented the strategy of a thousand stings—systematic administrative harassment of clans through raids, traffic stops, and asset seizures. Experiences from Sweden and Italy (the fight against the 'Ndrangheta) show that the most effective tool is hitting their wealth. The seizure of 77 Rammo clan properties in 2018 was a breakthrough, proving that the state must reclaim control over public space to stop being perceived as an intruder.
Summary
The German example shows that state passivity toward emerging enclaves comes at a high price. Clans are not the result of religion, but of a vacuum left by the state when it abandoned integration and law enforcement. As Poland faces migration challenges, can it learn from others' mistakes? The experiences of our western neighbors teach us that the clan begins where the state retreats. The key to security is not fear, but knowledge and the consistent maintenance of the monopoly of law over the clan code.
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