Introduction
After 1991, Russia, inheriting a nuclear arsenal and an imperial mentality, began to view politics as a zero-sum game. As Michał Lubina notes, Moscow plays politics like a chess grandmaster—striving for direct confrontation and the elimination of the opponent's pieces. Meanwhile, China plays Go, relying on patient encirclement and the seizure of strategic spaces. This fundamental difference in logic meant that the Russian bear, busy moving its pieces, failed to notice it was being entangled in a web whose rules it did not understand.
Russian Revisionism vs. Chinese Pragmatism
Relations between the two powers after the collapse of the USSR were defined by a clash of two distinct identities. Russia, suffering from "phantom pain" over its lost empire, built its position on a great-power myth and aggressive rhetoric. China, on the other hand, remembering its "century of humiliation," opted for a long-term strategy and the quiet building of economic power. Russia's degradation to the role of a junior partner did not stem from a lack of military strength, but from a civilizational gap.
While Moscow wasted energy on border wars and contesting the West, Beijing methodically occupied new squares on the global board. Russian revisionism, seeking to change borders, proved less effective than Chinese pragmatism, which, instead of destroying the opponent, makes them dependent on its influence and capital.
The Axis of Convenience and Economic Asymmetry
The cooperation between Moscow and Beijing is best described by the term axis of convenience. It is not an alliance based on shared values or ideology, but a cold arithmetic of benefits. Between 1991 and 2014, this relationship evolved toward a deep imbalance. Russia fell into a resource trap, becoming primarily an energy base for China, while Beijing provided the necessary capital and technology.
This process was bolstered by the personalization of power. From the chaotic Yeltsin, who sought a counterweight to the West in China, through the technocratic Putin, to the dominance of Xi Jinping. Each shifted the emphasis differently, but the direction remained constant: the institutionalization of relations served primarily to secure Chinese interests. Xi's visit to Moscow in 2013 was already a clear demonstration that Beijing was taking the initiative in this asymmetrical duo.
Benevolent Neutrality and the Pivot to Asia Trap
China's strategy toward Russian conflicts—from Georgia in 2008 to Ukraine in 2014—was based on benevolent neutrality. Beijing avoided condemning Moscow to avoid souring relations with its partner, but at the same time, it did not recognize secessions, mindful of its own territorial integrity. This stance was a masterstroke: China did not help Russia bypass sanctions but instead exploited its isolation to force more favorable contracts for gas and raw materials.
The Kremlin's announced pivot to Asia turned out to be a trap of one-sided dependence. By burning bridges with Europe, Russia did not find an equal ally in the East, but a patient creditor. The "China card," which Moscow tried to use to blackmail the West, became a tool of its own degradation. Beijing did not need declarations of brotherhood—it needed access to resources, which it obtained on its own terms.
Summary
The analysis of Russian-Chinese relations between 1991 and 2014 is a story of the inevitable defeat of a player who failed to notice the rules had changed. Russia lost not because it suddenly grew weak, but because it could not grasp that it is no longer the only power at the table. Believing it was still playing a game of chess, it became a mere pawn in China's game of Go.
Its return to Asia did not become a new beginning, but a haunting repetition of history—an echo of the times when the Tsarist empire had to accept terms dictated by a stronger neighbor. Today, the bear in the shadow of the dragon must face a reality where its resources and army are not enough to reverse the course of history dominated by Chinese power.
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