Introduction
The principle of the protection of acquired rights constitutes the axiological core of a state governed by the rule of law, defining the limits of permissible state interference in the sphere of individual entitlements. In the Polish constitutional order, based on Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, it is not merely a technical provision but a foundation for building the citizen's trust in the state. This article explores the complexity of this principle, analyzing its Polish context, international models, and the role of oversight bodies in maintaining the stability of the legal system. Readers will learn why this protection is not absolute and how the principle of proportionality shields us from legislative arbitrariness.
Józef Nowacki: The Criterion of Equity and Legitimate Expectations
In Polish doctrine, the concept of acquired rights lacks a statutory definition, making it a field for functional interpretation. Józef Nowacki introduced a key distinction between justly and unjustly acquired rights. Constitutional protection applies only to entitlements obtained in good faith and in accordance with the legal order. Rights acquired "unjustly"—for instance, resulting from legislative errors or abuses—may be restricted in the name of social justice.
The foundation of system stability is also the distinction between acquired rights and legitimate expectations (legal expectations). While the former are already concrete, expectations concern hopes for future benefits. Although the boundary between them can be fluid, the Constitutional Tribunal also extends protection to justified expectations, recognizing that unstable law destroys social and political capital, leading to a crisis of state legitimacy.
Models of Protection: Vertrauensschutz, Sécurité juridique, and Due Process
Comparative analysis reveals the universality of the protection of acquired rights despite a diversity of mechanisms. In Germany, the key concept is Vertrauensschutz (protection of trust) and a rigorous prohibition of retroactivity (Rückwirkungsverbot), which categorically forbids interference with completed factual situations. The French model is based on sécurité juridique (legal certainty), emphasizing the predictability of norms and the obligation to introduce transitional periods for stabilized situations.
In the American system, protection is provided by the doctrine of substantive due process, which protects so-called vested rights from arbitrary deprivation without proper procedure. All these systems share the conviction that the rule of law requires the preservation of the "internal morality of law." As Lon L. Fuller pointed out, law must be public, consistent, and applied consistently to deserve obedience and build a lasting foundation for the individual's legal security.
The Constitutional Tribunal as an Arbiter of Interests
In Poland, the protection of acquired rights is not absolute. The Constitutional Tribunal acts as an arbiter, weighing the interests of the individual against the public interest. Permissible changes to acquired rights must pass a rigorous proportionality test, which verifies whether the interference is necessary to protect higher-order values, such as budgetary balance or social justice.
In this context, doctrinal differences emerge between a formal rule of law state (focused on procedures) and a substantive rule of law state. The latter requires that the content of norms respects the dignity of the individual. If the legislator violates the citizens' trust through sudden and unjustified changes, the Tribunal serves as a constitutional filter, restoring balance. Ultimately, it is the principle of proportionality that verifies every legislative change, preventing the state from becoming a "capricious ruler."
Summary
The protection of acquired rights appears as a delicate interplay between what is promised and what is necessary. Can we sacrifice the certainty of those who trusted the law yesterday in the name of a future order? Analysis proves that the principle of trust remains the normative foundation of the system, and its violation carries fatal social consequences. Fidelity to one's word determines the strength and credibility of the state, even when systemic transformation necessitates difficult reforms. The protection of acquired rights is not a dogma, but a mechanism for civilizing the tension between stability and the dynamics of law in a democratic state.
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