Introduction
The conflict in the Gaza Strip is not merely a military clash, but above all, a brutal struggle over narratives and definitions. The way we name specific events determines our assessment of guilt and the legality of the violence employed.
In this article, we will analyze how terminology influences the interpretation of international law. You will learn why it is necessary to separate the immediate flashpoint from the historical genesis of the dispute, and how to distinguish war crimes from genocide in light of Norman Finkelstein's analyses.
The Struggle Over Concepts as a Foundation of Conflict
How events are labeled is crucial because it triggers specific legal norms and sanctions. For example, describing a destroyed home as collateral damage rather than an element of destroying living conditions changes the question of the perpetrator's criminal liability.
The use of terms such as occupation, blockade, or self-defense organizes our perception and indicates who is the victim and who is the aggressor. In international law, these labels are not merely rhetoric, but the foundation for establishing the obligations of the parties involved.
The war over nomenclature allows violence to be legitimized by giving it a veneer of legality. Whoever controls the conceptual apparatus imposes the method of classifying the world and interpreting the facts.
The Necessity of Rejecting Simplified Narratives from Both Sides
An analysis of the conflict cannot rely solely on official reports, as both sides employ the mechanism of confirmation bias. Israel presents its actions as a response to terror, while supporters of Palestine view them as a continuation of systemic dominance.
A rigorous approach requires rejecting the dichotomy: either a total denial of the right to self-defense or the ignoring of years of structural violence. Scholarship must examine causal links without confusing an explanation with a justification.
Pointing out the mechanisms of Palestinian radicalization is not equivalent to legitimizing the murder of civilians. Similarly, acknowledging the tragedy of October 7th does not give the Israeli state carte blanche to violate humanitarian law.
Distinguishing the Flashpoint from the Genesis of the Conflict
One must separate the immediate flashpoint—the October 7th attack—from the deep genesis of the dispute dating back to 1948 (the Nakba). Without the context of occupation and blockade, it is impossible to understand the dynamics of modern-day Gaza.
It is essential to distinguish between jus ad bellum (the right to go to war) and jus in bello (the rules of conduct during war). The right to self-defense does not legalize all methods of attack, nor does it remove the obligation to protect civilians.
Even if an opponent utilizes civilian infrastructure, the attacker must adhere to the principles of proportionality and distinction. Genocide differs from war crimes by the presence of dolus specialis—the specific intent to destroy a group.
Summary
In a world dominated by a marketplace of narratives, truth becomes a commodity with a drastically increasing cost of verification. We often choose bundles of evidence that fit our identity rather than striving for an objective judgment.
The ultimate test of international law will not be a single verdict, but our ability to independently analyze facts across political divides. True justice requires applying the same evidentiary standards to every party in the conflict.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why does the way events are named in the Gaza conflict have legal and political significance?
The way events are named determines who is the perpetrator and who is the victim, and it organizes the field of perception and understanding of conflicts. In international law, specific concepts trigger different norms, obligations, evidentiary standards, as well as procedures and sanctions.
1. Why cannot the analysis of the conflict in Gaza rely solely on official narratives from the parties or radical interpretations?
2. Relying exclusively on official narratives or radical interpretations may lead to overlooking essential contexts, such as historical asymmetry and occupation, or security objectives and the nature of urban warfare. Proper analysis requires verifying the premises of both sides and examining causal links without replacing a reliable explanation with ready-made images of reality.
3. What is the difference between the immediate cause of the conflict in Gaza and its deeper historical and legal causes?
4. The immediate flashpoint of the conflict can be determined with hourly precision, whereas its social and historical genesis spans decades. Deep causes include differing experiences related to the 1948 war and legal disputes regarding the status of the occupation of territories seized in 1967.
5. How can one understand the mechanism of escalation in the Gaza conflict without falling into unilateral narratives about siege or terrorism?
6. The escalation of the conflict in Gaza results from the security dilemma mechanism, in which actions taken by one side to protect itself increase the sense of threat felt by the other side. Restrictions imposed by Israel are intended to weaken Hamas's military capabilities, but simultaneously may radicalize society, leading to rocket attacks that reinforce Israel's belief in the necessity of maintaining restrictions.
7. Is pointing out the causes of Palestinian radicalization equivalent to justifying their violence?
8. No, identifying the causes of radicalization is not equivalent to justifying violence. Explaining factors such as occupation or blockade serves to understand the historical mechanism, but it does not change the legal or moral status of killing civilians and taking hostages.
9. Do the crimes of one side entitle the other side to ignore humanitarian law regarding civilians?
10. No, Hamas's crimes did not invalidate humanitarian law nor give Israel carte blanche regarding the population of Gaza. The protection of civilians does not depend on the moral innocence of their state or army; therefore, previous violations of Palestinians' rights did not revoke the protection of Israeli civilians, and the October 7th attack does not remove the protection of Palestinian civilians.
Does the right to self-defense automatically legalize all methods of waging war?
No, the right to self-defense does not automatically legalize all methods of waging war. International law distinguishes between the admissibility of the use of force (jus ad bellum) and the conduct of conflict (jus in bello), meaning that a state acting in self-defense must still adhere to the rules for the protection of the civilian population.
Does the right to self-defense allow for ignoring the protection of civilians if the adversary uses their infrastructure for military purposes?
No. The use of civilian infrastructure by an adversary and the right to self-defense do not exempt the attacker from the obligation to comply with international humanitarian law. The attacking party must continue to apply the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution; violations of these principles by the other party do not grant the right to ignore the protection of civilians.
Does the analysis of individual strikes under the laws of war preclude the possibility of establishing genocide?
No, the analysis of individual strikes does not preclude a finding of genocide, as the examination of repetitive effects and operational patterns can be evidentially relevant. An attack may meet the requirements of the law of armed conflict while simultaneously constituting an element of a broader genocidal policy if accompanied by the appropriate intent.
How does genocide differ from other grave war crimes, and how does the ICJ approach proving the perpetrator's intent?
Genocide differs from other grave crimes through the requirement of specific intent (dolus specialis), consisting of the aim to physically or biologically destroy a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, in whole or in part. The ICJ reconstructs this intent indirectly, analyzing, among other things, statements by leaders and patterns of the perpetrator's behavior. If intent is inferred from the pattern of conduct alone, it must be the only reasonable inference that can be drawn.
Are arrest warrants from the ICC equivalent to a recognition of genocide, and how does the law distinguish between different types of war crimes?
ICC arrest warrants are not equivalent to a recognition of genocide, as a warrant is not a conviction and charges are not identical to a judicial determination of such a crime. The law distinguishes war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide as separate legal constructs with different prerequisites, rather than degrees on a single scale.
How can one distinguish a collection of individual war incidents from a systemic process aimed at the destruction of a population?
This distinction requires an analysis of mechanisms and an examination of the link between catastrophic effects and the knowledge of decision-makers, their statements, and the continuation of practices despite awareness of the consequences. It is crucial to determine whether a vast number of individual decisions cease to be a collection of incidents and begin to reveal the characteristics of a single process, which in criminal law allows for the inference of intent.
How does the analysis of war crimes differ from the analysis of genocide, and how should evidence be verified under conditions of war?
The analysis of war crimes focuses on the methods and means of conducting armed operations, whereas the analysis of genocide focuses on a specific destructive purpose directed at a protected group. In wartime, evidence should be verified by analyzing specific claims and supporting materials, avoiding dichotomies and not assuming that the falsity of one testimony automatically falsifies the others.
How does Pramila Patten's UN report address the sexual violence of October 7th, and why is its interpretation problematic?
The report states there are reasonable grounds to believe that sexual violence occurred in several locations on October 7th and contains convincing information regarding rape and torture of some hostages. The interpretation of the document is problematic because the subtle standards of certainty used by experts are often simplified in the media into categorical statements about events being 'confirmed' or 'proven'.
Does the fact that some drastic accounts from October 7th turned out to be false undermine the credibility of all evidence regarding sexual violence?
The fact that some drastic accounts proved to be false or unverifiable does not logically mean that the remaining findings are incorrect. Considering all information as contaminated based on a few false stories is an error in evidence selection.
How should the justice system and international institutions approach the verification of allegations of sexual violence in wartime to avoid both naivety and systematic disbelief?
The justice system should combine treating testimonies with full seriousness with the recognition that they are material requiring evaluation. A mature institutional standard must protect the person reporting violence and verify the truthfulness of their claims, avoiding both the automatic acceptance of every allegation as fact and systematic disbelief.
Does acknowledging sexual violence on both sides of the conflict mean that both sides are equally guilty?
No. Acknowledging the occurrence of sexual violence on both sides does not automatically imply equality of guilt, as the scale, circumstances, and evidence may differ. The universalism of human rights merely requires applying the same norms and assessment standards to every perpetrator, regardless of their identity.
Does the fact that some reports of violence are manipulated or propagandistic mean that the entire phenomenon is untrue?
No, the propagandistic use of a fact does not automatically make that fact cease to be a fact. Analyzing the form of communication or detecting manipulation in reports cannot serve as evidence that the events themselves are false.
Why is it so difficult to unequivocally verify reports of crimes and violence in the Gaza conflict?
The main obstacle is the lack of access for investigative bodies and international organizations to crime scenes and witnesses, resulting from state control over the infrastructure of fact production. Verification is also hindered by the dependence of international organizations on entry permits, as well as the pressure of time and emotion accompanying media activities.
Is it possible to reach the objective truth under conditions of war and political pressure, and how should the impartiality of the institutions investigating it be assessed?
Reaching the objective truth in conditions of war is possible because facts exist, although access to them is socially organized and costly. The impartiality of institutions should be evaluated not only through the prism of intentions but also through asymmetry of data access, bounded rationality, and potential external influence or ideological dependence.
