Introduction
Bogusław Wolniewicz views axiology not as a static catalog of values, but as an investigation into their internal logic and inevitable conflicts. In his view, the moral system guiding social life must be inherently contradictory, as it arises from real, historical human experience. Understanding this structure allows us to grasp why truth constitutes the foundation of our civilization and the dangers posed by its relativization. In this article, we analyze how Wolniewicz’s thoughts address contemporary ethical and political dilemmas.
Formal and Substantive Axiology: Hierarchy vs. Content
Wolniewicz introduces a key distinction between formal axiology and substantive axiology. The former analyzes the logical relationships between norms without judging their validity. Only substantive axiology fills these frameworks with specific content, creating a civilizational normotype. For the Western world, this foundation is Christianity, understood as a moral heritage that shapes the consciences of all community members.
A defining feature of this system is the absence of a single, absolutely superior value (supremum). Truth, while the highest value of its kind, coexists with mercy or justice. This lack of a supreme value makes the system inevitably conflict-ridden. There is no universal rule to determine whether honesty or mercy is more important at any given moment, forcing the individual to take personal responsibility for every moral choice.
Wolniewicz: Service to Truth as the Foundation of Ethics
In the philosopher’s view, man serves the truth, not the other way around. Truthfulness is not a matter of politeness, but an act of loyalty to being. Wolniewicz treats lying in aesthetic terms—as a deformation of reality and a contamination of language. He compares it to sewage released into a clean river; even a drop of falsehood poisons the entire medium of social communication.
The author sharply criticizes the contemporary paradigm of dignity, which attempts to replace the traditional normotype. In this humanistic model, truth becomes a conditional value, binding only when it does not violate a vaguely defined "dignity." Wolniewicz notes that, in practice, dignity is often confused with reputation. This substitution of terms becomes a license to protect images built on lies, which inevitably destroys the fabric of social trust.
Abnormal Situations and Intermediate Principles
In real life, ethically abnormal situations occur where two primary values collide. An example is a doctor deciding whether to reveal a terminal diagnosis to a patient, or a politician weighing truth against national security. In such moments, intermediate principles are essential, allowing general imperatives to be adapted to specific circumstances without being invalidated.
Wolniewicz allows for the existence of justifications for lying (kontratypy)—situations where telling an untruth is not morally reprehensible (e.g., to protect a life). This is not relativism, however, but a prudent weighing of reasons. To lie is to speak untruth where there is an obligation to tell the truth. If this obligation is suspended by a higher necessity, we are faced with the tragedy of choice, not a moral license for falsehood.
Summary: The Collapse of the Normotype Destabilizes Modern Democracy
The erosion of the traditional normotype strikes at the very foundations of democracy. When truth ceases to be an autotelic value and becomes a tool of political utility, the public sphere degrades. Without an absolute mandate for truthfulness, democracy loses its legitimacy and becomes an empty procedure where lying becomes an acceptable lifestyle.
Wolniewicz’s conclusion is stark: attempts to "civilize" morality by removing its conflicts lead to its sterilization. The belief that evil can be banished through "humanistic exorcisms" while maintaining the right to lie in the name of higher reasons is a manifestation of deep, diabolical irony. Truth remains the ultimate judge of man, and its abandonment always leads to civilizational decay.
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