Introduction
In classical philosophy of law, the common good (bonum commune) is not merely a rhetorical slogan, but the foundation of the political system. It constitutes the ultimate purpose of the political community and the measure of legitimacy for any authority. Unlike positivist concepts, this tradition does not view it as a simple sum of interests, but as an objective set of conditions enabling the integral development of all members of society. In this article, you will learn how this idea evolved from antiquity, through the Constitution of May 3, to contemporary disputes over the foundations of the Polish state.
Classical Philosophy of Law and the Legacy of the Constitution of May 3
The tradition established by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas understands the common good in two ways. In its subjective dimension, it refers to the moral and intellectual development of individuals, while in its objective dimension, it is the system of institutions and laws that makes this development possible. Thus, the state exists not for mere survival, but for the "good life" of its citizens.
These classical intuitions became the foundation of the Constitution of May 3. Although the document did not explicitly define the term, it established the "general good" as the state's primary reason for being. The 1791 reform proved that the primacy of functional order over anarchic liberty is essential to securing individual dignity. Consequently, the common good became the criterion for evaluating the justice of state institutions.
Personalism and the Modern Understanding of the Common Good
Modern Catholic Social Teaching, particularly the documents of the Second Vatican Council, brought a personalist turn to the understanding of bonum commune. It is defined as the sum of social conditions that allow individuals and families to achieve their perfection more fully. In this view, the dignity of the human person is prior to the state and serves as the source of inalienable subjective rights.
This heritage is found in Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997. The deliberate shift in word order to "dobro wspólne" (instead of "wspólne dobro") signals that the Republic is not an abstract interest of the power apparatus, but a space for citizen development. This interpretation grants the common good the status of a basic norm, allowing for the review of the constitutionality of statutory law through the lens of human protection.
The Statist Trap and the Manifesto of Positivism
However, the history of Polish constitutionalism has seen a different approach. The April Constitution of 1935 equated the common good with the state itself. In this statist vision, the individual exists for the state, and civil rights are merely a "concession" from authority. This leads to legal positivism, where the only source of legitimacy is the will of the sovereign rather than an objective order of values.
In modern times, this thinking was echoed in the 2011 dissenting opinion of Judge Zbigniew Cieślak. It was considered a manifesto of positivism because it reduces the common good solely to the content written in statutes. Such a separation of law from pre-political values paralyzes the protective function of the Constitution. If the legislator arbitrarily creates values, the citizen loses the shield protecting them from the despotism of a parliamentary majority.
Summary: Legality vs. Legitimacy
The separation of law from objective values leads to a system that, instead of building trust, merely enforces obedience. As Ronald Dworkin pointed out, this distinction determines whether we live under the rule of law or merely the rule of rules. Statutory law that ignores human dignity and the common good loses its moral legitimacy.
The classical doctrine of natural law, instilled in Poland by the creators of the Government Act of 1791, serves as a reminder: the formal validity of a legal act is not enough. For law to be truly binding, it must serve to realize the conditions for personal development. In an era of growing constitutional crises, returning to this understanding of the common good seems the only way to preserve the subjectivity of the citizen.
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