More-than-human ethics in design practice: extending Jeffrey Bulger's model with a non-anthropocentric perspective

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More-than-human ethics in design practice: extending Jeffrey Bulger's model with a non-anthropocentric perspective

📚 Based on

Design Ethics in Practice
()
Oxford University Press
ISBN: 9780197772195

👤 About the Author

Jeffrey Bulger

Rosalind Franklin University of Medicine and Science

Jeffrey W. Bulger is an American bioethicist and philosopher who serves as Emeritus Professor of Bioethics and Humanities in the Department of Foundational Sciences and Humanities at Rosalind Franklin University of Medicine and Science's Chicago Medical School. He earned a bachelor's degree in geology and petroleum engineering from the University of North Dakota and a PhD in philosophy with a specialization in biomedical ethics from the University of Tennessee. A certified healthcare ethics consultant, Bulger served as director of the Office of Bioethics and Humanities and editor-in-chief of the medical humanities journal Synapses. His scholarly work focuses on biomedical ethics, shared clinical decision-making, healthcare professional education, and the procedural application of ethical principlism—autonomy, beneficence, and justice—to institutional practices and built environment design.

Introduction

Traditional design focuses almost exclusively on humans. More-than-human ethics challenge this approach by introducing a non-anthropocentric perspective into decision-making processes.

This text analyzes how to expand Jeffrey Bulger's model to include the interests of voiceless entities. The reader will learn why nature possesses intrinsic value and how to create a system of justifiable footprints that protects ecosystems without paralyzing design activities.

The Limits of Anthropocentrism in Design Ethics

Moral stakeholders in the design process should not be limited to persons, but should include all entities capable of suffering harm as well as ecological systems. This encompasses animals, plants, rivers, and future generations.

A key distinction must be made between instrumental value and intrinsic value. Nature is not merely a resource for human use; it possesses significance independent of its utility to us.

Consider a wetland as an example. If we treat it solely as a water filter, we might replace it with technology. However, if we recognize its intrinsic value as a living ecosystem, technical substitution does not resolve the moral problem.

Specific Conflicts Between Function and Nature

In practice, conflict arises where human convenience or profit compromises the well-being of non-human beings. These are often side effects that are ignored in standard analyses.

Glass building facades may be energy-efficient, yet they become traps for birds. Lighting infrastructure improves human safety but disrupts the biological cycles of nocturnal organisms.

A similar dilemma occurs when constructing roads that intersect animal migration corridors. In this case, transport functionality directly clashes with the right of species to survive and move freely.

Representation of Interests and Pluralism of Natural Values

The interests of voiceless entities can be integrated through institutional representation. Since animals or rivers cannot participate in consultations, advocates must be appointed on their behalf.

One solution is the introduction of an ecological advocate role within structures such as a Design Ethics Board. Such an individual presents arguments from the perspective of the natural system, preventing nature from being marginalized.

Implementing this ethics requires proportionality. Rather than endless analyses, reviews should be triggered based on the scale of risk and the irreversibility of changes. This avoids decision paralysis while maintaining moral rigor.

Summary

The challenge lies in creating a system that is not merely a facade for economic calculations. We must balance moral rigor with actual design agency.

The ultimate goal is an ethics sufficient to curb recklessness, but not so cumbersome that it becomes an intellectual luxury. It is about transitioning from human dominance toward responsible coexistence.

Mind map: More-than-human Ethics in Design Practice

📖 Glossary

Antropocentryzm
Pogląd uznający człowieka za centrum wszechświata i jedyny byt posiadający pełną wartość wewnętrzną, traktujący naturę głównie jako zasób.
Sentience
Zdolność istot żywych do odczuwania bólu, cierpienia oraz przyjemności, co stanowi podstawę do przyznania im statusu moralnego.
Non-identity problem
Paradoks filozoficzny wskazujący, że decyzje dzisiejsze zmieniają to, kto urodzi się w przyszłości, co utrudnia ocenę krzywdy konkretnych osób.
Wartości relacyjne (Relational values)
Wartości wynikające z jakości więzi między ludźmi a naturą, obejmujące tożsamość, pamięć i kulturowe znaczenie krajobrazu.
Moral agency vs Moral patiency
Rozróżnienie między bytem zdolnym do podejmowania decyzji moralnych (agency) a bytem, który może być odbiorcą działań moralnych i odczuwać krzywdę (patiency).
Institutionalized dissent
Sformalizowany mechanizm wprowadzania sprzeciwu lub alternatywnego punktu widzenia do procesu decyzyjnego w celu ochrony mniejszości lub bytów niemych.

Frequently Asked Questions

Who or what should be recognized as a moral party in the design process beyond humans alone?
Beyond humans, animals, living organisms, ecosystems, species, and biotic communities can be recognized as moral parties. The basis for their status may be the capacity to feel suffering (sentience), possessing their own good independent of human utility, or the intrinsic value of entire ecological systems.
How does the conflict between human interests and the well-being of animals and ecosystems manifest in design practice?
This conflict manifests in infrastructure design, where benefits for humans—such as mobility (highways), safety (lighting), or aesthetics and cost savings (glass facades)—lead to animal suffering, habitat destruction, and collisions.
How can the interests of beings and systems that cannot speak for themselves or participate in consultations be incorporated into the design process?
The interests of beings and systems unable to participate in consultations can be included through representation, for example, via an ethics committee. In the case of nature, this process is based on the analysis of instrumental, intrinsic, and relational values, avoiding the reduction of all values solely to monetary metrics.
How can the interests of nature and animals be included in decision-making processes, given that they cannot speak on their own behalf?
This can be achieved by granting legal personality to nature or ecosystems, which allows their interests to be represented by designated representative structures. Alternatively, advocacy roles (e.g., an ecological ombudsman) can be established to present arguments from the perspective of nature and animals in decision-making processes.
How can bioethical tools be applied to protect nature and future generations, since they cannot give their consent?
Bioethical tools should be applied by replacing literal consent with functional protection equivalents tailored to the type of subject (e.g., animal welfare or ecosystem integrity). For future generations, protection is based on quality-of-life standards and the principle of reversibility, meaning avoiding environmental degradation and securing the scope of their future capabilities.
How can the interests of nature and animals be represented in design practice, given that they cannot speak for themselves?
Yes, this is possible by creating institutional mechanisms for representation and advocacy for absent entities. Examples from Ecuador and New Zealand show that the law can grant nature the status of a legal person or create representative structures, recognizing that an inability to speak does not mean a lack of protectable interests.
How can more-than-human ethics be implemented in the design process in practice without leading to decision paralysis?
Implementing more-than-human ethics requires applying the principle of proportionality, where the scope of analysis and representation of interests is tailored to the scale of risk and the irreversibility of the project. Instead of infinitely expanding committees, a second-order governance model should be used, in which an institution can recognize a lack of specific competencies and trigger appropriate expert support only when necessary.

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