Ronald Dworkin's Philosophy of Law and Its Polish Contexts

🇵🇱 Polski
Ronald Dworkin's Philosophy of Law and Its Polish Contexts

Introduction

Ronald Dworkin revolutionized legal thought by rejecting the vision of dry regulations in favor of moral coherence. His theory of law as integrity posits that the legal system is not merely a collection of rules, but a living structure built upon fundamental values. In the Polish context—ranging from abortion disputes to state-church relations—Dworkin’s thought becomes a crucial tool for analyzing the legitimacy of power. This article explores why a judge must sometimes be a philosopher and how individual rights protect us from the tyranny of the majority.

"All-or-Nothing" Rules vs. Weighing Principles

The foundation of Dworkin’s theory is the distinction between rules and principles. Legal rules operate binarily: they are either applicable in full or not at all. An example is Article 148 of the Penal Code—if the criteria for murder are met, a sentence must be imposed. Legal principles function quite differently, acting like a compass that points the way. They do not "fail" when in conflict with other norms; instead, they possess a dimension of weight. In a specific case, one principle may yield to another without losing its place in the system.

In this view, individual rights function as trumps. This means they take precedence over general policy goals or social utility. If a citizen exercises their freedom of assembly, the state cannot ban it simply to improve traffic flow. A right-as-trump "beats" arguments of collective convenience, protecting fundamental human dignity. The process of choosing the correct norm relies on two criteria: fit (consistency with judicial history) and justification (identifying the best moral foundation for a given practice).

Judge Hercules Finds the One Right Answer

Dworkin challenged the legal positivism of H.L.A. Hart and Hans Kelsen. While Hart saw law as a system of rules based on social acceptance, and Kelsen viewed it as a sterile hierarchy of norms (the Grundnorm), Dworkin integrated morality into the very definition of law. He created the ideal interpreter in Judge Hercules—a mythical figure who, through superhuman intellect, finds the one right answer even in the most difficult cases. Hercules does not rely on discretion but reconstructs the system to present it in its best light.

Hercules’ method is constructive interpretation, which proceeds in three stages: pre-interpretive (identifying the legal material), interpretive (searching for moral meaning), and post-interpretive (reforming the practice in light of the discovered principles). This procedure ensures law as integrity and eliminates so-called "checkerboard" solutions—situations where the state applies contradictory standards to similar citizens, undermining trust in the legal order.

Abortion and State-Church Relations as "Hard Cases"

In the Polish reality, Dworkin’s concepts help us understand so-called hard cases. The abortion dispute is a classic conflict of principles: the protection of life versus the autonomy and dignity of women. According to Dworkin, a judge cannot stop at the literal wording of regulations but must weigh these values, striving for the coherence of the entire system. Similarly, in state-church relations: integrity requires that the principle of religious equality not be sacrificed for temporary political interests or the privileges of a single community.

Crucial here is the distinction between the formal validity of a norm and its force of law. A regulation may exist in the code, but if it flagrantly violates the principles of equal concern and respect, it loses its moral legitimacy to be enforced. This idea, supported by the concepts of Lon Fuller (the internal morality of law) and John Rawls (justice as fairness), reminds us that the judge's role in balancing conflicting constitutional principles is the foundation of a democratic state governed by the rule of law.

Summary

Law in its most sublime form is neither a dry record nor a tool for political struggle, but a continuous search for justice. It requires not only intellect but also a deep sense of moral responsibility for the system's coherence. In a world where rules seem to give way to interests, does law as integrity still have a chance to serve as a compass for judges? Or are we destined for an endless dance between the letter of the law and its spirit?

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Frequently Asked Questions

How does a legal rule differ from a principle in Dworkin's theory?
A rule operates in binary terms (either it applies fully or not at all), while a principle is a compass that sets a direction, the weight of which depends on the context of a specific case.
What is the concept of rights as assets?
Individual rights act as a trump card in the game: they take precedence over the general objectives of state policy, protecting fundamental freedoms over collective interests.
What are the three stages of constructive interpretation?
This process includes a pre-interpretation phase (reconstruction of regulations), an interpretation phase (search for moral meaning) and a post-interpretation phase (modification of the interpretation in the light of the principles).
Why does the integrity of the law exclude so-called checkerboards?
Because the state must speak with one voice; applying conflicting standards in similar situations undermines the moral and institutional coherence of the system.
What is the main difference between Dworkin and legal pragmatism?
Pragmatism treats law instrumentally to the realization of future goals, while Dworkin requires that every decision be rooted in the rules and history of the system.

Related Questions

Tags: Ronald Dworkin legal principle legal rule law as integrity Judge Hercules hard case fit criterion constructive interpretation rights as assets force of law conventionalism legal pragmatism rule of recognition integrity of the law Polish legal context