The instrumentalization of law in authoritarian systems in light of Jason Stanley's theory and the philosophy of law

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The article analyzes a dangerous mechanism in which law ceases to be a guarantor of freedom and becomes a sophisticated tool of authoritarian domination. The author posits that fascism does not consist of the simple abolition of the legal order, but rather its instrumentalization—a process in which formal legality (compliance with procedure) is separated from actual rule of law and justice. By confronting the thoughts of key legal theorists—from Carl Schmitt's political decisionist approach and Hans Kelsen's normativism, through Gustav Radbruch's concept of 'statutory lawlessness' and Ernst Fraenkel's theory of the 'dual state,' to Ronald Dworkin's interpretative philosophy—the text demonstrates how totalitarian systems can maintain a semblance of institutional stability while selectively excluding certain groups from legal protection. The main goal of the analysis is to prove that the only effective barrier against the authoritarian takeover of the state is not the mere existence of statutes, but the recognition of inalienable individual rights and the principle of equal treatment as superior to immediate political goals or collective interest.

The instrumentalization of law in authoritarian systems in light of Jason Stanley's theory and the philosophy of law

Introduction

This article analyzes the mechanism by which law ceases to protect freedom and instead becomes a tool for authoritarian dominance. This theme is critical to understanding how modern dictatorships seize power not by abolishing the law, but through its precise instrumentalization.

The reader will discover how formal compliance with procedures can mask systemic lawlessness. The text contrasts the theories of legal philosophers such as Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, Gustav Radbruch, Ernst Fraenkel, and Ronald Dworkin to identify the barriers that protect the individual from tyranny.

Law as a Tool of Authoritarian Dominance

Schmitt observes that fascist regimes do not reject the law entirely. Instead, they utilize existing institutions to legitimize political dominance and subordinate the individual to the state.

This process involves the gradual erosion of judicial autonomy and the stripping of legal protections from selected groups. An example is the Nazi consolidation of power, which relied on enabling acts and the transformation of exceptions into permanent instruments of control.

In such a system, the law does not disappear; rather, its function changes. It ceases to limit the arbitrariness of power and becomes a tool for achieving goals dictated by the leader.

The Distinction Between Formal Legality and Genuine Rule of Law

The use of statutes and procedures does not imply action within the rule of law. A distinction must be made between legality (formal compliance with a regulation) and the rule of law (a structure that limits power).

Hans Kelsen points out that one can recognize the formal validity of a norm without simultaneously acknowledging it as just. This distinction allows for the identification of systems in which the law is morally reprehensible despite adhering to procedure.

Gustav Radbruch, on the other hand, introduces the concept of statutory lawlessness. He argues that when a statute flagrantly violates justice or deliberately rejects equality, it loses its character as law and should not be considered binding.

Sovereignty as the Decision on the State of Exception

Carl Schmitt defines sovereignty as the ability to decide on a state of exception. Such a concept can lead to the dismantling of democracy when a political decision is placed above legal norms.

The instrumentalization of law is evident in Ernst Fraenkel's theory of the dual state. This system combines the normative state (predictable law for the privileged) with the prerogative state (arbitrary violence against opponents).

A counterweight to this is the philosophy of Ronald Dworkin. He views individual rights as trumps (rights as trumps) that override collective interests. According to Dworkin, the legitimacy of the state depends on treating citizens with equal concern and respect, which blocks discrimination carried out in the name of the national good.

Conclusion

The greatest paradox of modernity is that the law destroys the human being most effectively not when it vanishes, but when it serves tyranny with perfect formal consistency.

A system that maintains efficient procedures only for a select few cannot be considered to be governed by the rule of law. True protection against authoritarianism requires recognizing inalienable individual rights as more important than immediate political goals.

The critical question remains: where does obedience to the letter of the law end, and the duty of fidelity to justice begin?

📚 Based on

How Fascism Works Jason Stanley

Random House
ISBN: 9780525511847

👤 About the book's author

Jason Stanley

Yale University

Jason Stanley (born 1969) is an American philosopher and the Jacob Urowsky Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. He is widely recognized for his contributions to the philosophy of language, epistemology, and political philosophy. After earning his PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1995, Stanley held faculty positions at Cornell University, the University of Michigan, and Rutgers University before joining Yale in 2013. His early research focused on formal semantics, context-dependence, and the epistemological nature of practical knowledge, arguing notably that knowing-how is a species of propositional knowledge. He later shifted toward political philosophy, examining the mechanics of political rhetoric, authoritarianism, and propaganda, particularly analyzing how propaganda and flawed ideologies undermine democratic deliberation and uphold unjust social hierarchies.

Mind map: The Instrumentalization of Law in Authoritarian Systems

📖 Glossary

Instrumentalizacja prawa
Wykorzystywanie przepisów prawnych i instytucji państwowych jako narzędzi do osiągania celów politycznych, często w celu legitymizacji ucisku.
Grundnorm (Norma Podstawowa)
Założenie teoretyczne w systemie Kelsena, które stanowi najwyższy punkt hierarchii i nadaje ważność wszystkim innym normom prawnym.
Państwo dualne
System, w którym obok przewidywalnego prawa (np. gospodarczego) istnieje sfera arbitralnej władzy politycznej stosowanej wobec przeciwników reżimu.
Prawo jako integralność
Koncepcja Dworkina zakładająca, że prawo powinno być interpretowane jako spójna praktyka, oparta na zasadach sprawiedliwości i moralnej odpowiedzialności.
Legalność vs Praworządność
Rozróżnienie między formalną zgodnością działania z przepisem (legalność) a systemem ograniczania władzy w imię sprawiedliwości i praw człowieka (praworządność).
Sędzia Herkules
Hipotetyczny ideał sędziego, który potrafi idealnie zinterpretować cały system prawny, odnajdując najlepsze uzasadnienie dla każdej decyzji.

Frequently Asked Questions

Do fascist regimes completely reject the law, or do they utilize it in a different way?
Fascist regimes do not reject the law entirely, but rather utilize existing institutions to legitimize political dominance. Law ceases to limit power and instead becomes an instrument for achieving the leadership's goals through the gradual alteration of state body competencies and the restriction of legal protection for selected groups.
Does the fact that fascist regimes utilized laws and procedures mean that they operated within the rule of law?
No, the mere application of laws and procedures does not imply the existence of the rule of law, as evidenced by the experiences of fascism. Modern rule of law goes beyond formal compliance with the law, encompassing, among other things, the prohibition of arbitrariness and the independence of courts.
How can legal and political concepts, such as the theory of the state of exception, lead to the dismantling of the democratic order?
The dismantling of the democratic order may occur when a decision on a state of exception escapes normative control or is used to permanently deprive political opponents of their status as equal participants in the law. A threat also arises when the extraordinary powers of the executive branch dominate over democratic parliamentary accountability.
How can legal theories be used to legitimize state violence, and what are the alternative approaches to the structure of law?
Legal theories can legitimize state violence by presenting a leader's political decisions as acts of protecting the legal order or expressions of historical necessity. Alternative approaches include Dworkin's philosophy, focused on justifying state actions in light of individual rights, and Hans Kelsen's legal positivism, which proposes a hierarchical structure of norms based on a basic norm (Grundnorm).
How does Hans Kelsen's concept allow for the distinction between valid law and just law, and how can the arbitrariness of power be institutionally limited?
Hans Kelsen distinguished the validity of law from its moral approval, allowing for the analysis of legal systems without the need to recognize them as just. To institutionally limit the arbitrariness of power, he proposed constitutional review carried out by a specialized judicial body capable of eliminating norms that contradict the constitution.
Is law established in accordance with procedures always just and binding?
No, a regulation established according to the rules of a system may possess formal validity while simultaneously being flagrantly unjust. Formal legality is not identical to moral legitimacy and does not constitute an automatic justification for unconditional obedience.
Should a law that has been formally enacted but is flagrantly unjust or discriminatory still be considered valid law?
Positive law should yield to the requirements of justice when the contradiction between the content of the statute and justice reaches an unbearable level. A particular ground for refusing to recognize a norm as law is a situation in which the legislator consciously rejects equality, which may be regarded as an act of statutory lawlessness.
How is it possible that courts and statutes continue to function in fascist regimes despite the prevailing lawlessness?
Fascist regimes operate as dual states, in which a normative state with a system of courts and laws exists alongside arbitrary political power (the prerogative state). These structures are maintained to ensure the stability and predictability necessary for the economy and administration to function, while the party apparatus can selectively deviate from these rules.
Can a system be considered based on the rule of law if procedures operate efficiently only for some citizens?
A system cannot be considered based on the rule of law if it denies equal moral status and legal protection to some of its members. According to Dworkin's perspective, merely maintaining efficient procedures in selected areas is insufficient, as the rule of law requires adherence to the principles of integrity and the equal treatment of all citizens.
How does Ronald Dworkin's concept of individual rights allow one to oppose the argument that the interest of the nation or the majority can justify violating the rights of specific individuals?
Ronald Dworkin's concept treats individual rights as 'trumps,' which set impassable boundaries for the realization of collective goals, even if their violation would benefit the majority. These rights constitute an immanent limitation on public power because they derive from the moral status of the human being and the duty to treat every member of the community with equal concern and respect.
Why is appealing to the national interest alone insufficient to justify the discrimination of specific groups?
Collective benefit alone is not sufficient because the state has a duty to treat all members of the community with equal concern and respect. This requires providing a justification that respects the fundamental status of the persons affected by the regulation, as citizens cannot be assigned different moral values based on their group affiliation.
How does the concept of law as integrity protect against the instrumental and unequal application of regulations by the state?
The concept of law as integrity requires the state to treat citizens according to a consistent system of principles, rather than in a manner dependent on momentary political advantage. It protects against arbitrariness by mandating that regulations be interpreted in light of the principles of justice and equality, which prevents the universality of rights from being replaced by a hierarchy of affiliation.
Is there a way to interpret the law that protects the individual from discriminatory regulations, and what are the limitations of such an approach?
The interpretation of law can protect the individual by appealing to overarching principles, such as equality and human dignity, allowing for an assessment of whether discriminatory regulations are consistent with the legal system as a whole. A limitation of this approach occurs when all legislation and institutions are systematically subordinated to a discriminatory ideology, rendering interpretation insufficient and necessitating external moral critique and international standards.

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