Introduction
In Polish legal theory, Józef Nowacki’s essay "Rule of Law: Two Problems" serves as the foundation for analyzing concepts that are often conflated in public debate. The author precisely distinguishes between the law-abiding state, the rule of law, and the legal state (Rechtsstaat), noting that their common denominator is the idea of subjecting public authority to norms. As Gustav Radbruch observed, the essence of this system lies in the fact that the law also binds those who create it. This article analyzes the evolution of these ideas—from purely technical legalism to a modern axiological dimension where law becomes a guarantor of dignity and justice.
The Law-Abiding State vs. the Rule of Law: Definitional Differences
Józef Nowacki identifies the primacy of statutes and the binding of state organs by law as the key element of the legal state (Rechtsstaat). In the classical view, the rule of law is a negative postulate: authority must act solely on the basis of and within the limits of norms. Such formalism creates a barrier against arbitrariness, ensuring predictability for citizens. Over time, however, this concept was supplemented by a positive postulate—the requirement that the state actively guarantee freedoms and social rights.
Analyzing the Anglo-Saxon vs. Continental model, we see different sources of legitimacy. The Anglo-Saxon Rule of Law emphasizes the primacy of law over all political power. While the Continental tradition trusts the letter of the statute, the Anglo-Saxon system relies on the independence of courts and the power of precedent. The rule of law in this version is not just a political project, but an intricate architecture of checks and balances preventing the concentration of power in the hands of an individual.
A Three-Tiered Structure: From Form to Axiology
The modern understanding of the rule of law rests on three levels. The formal level is the technical skeleton of the system: legal certainty, the prohibition of retroactivity, and the consistency of norms. Lon Fuller termed this the internal morality of law, formulating eight requirements (including generality, clarity, and stability) without which a system becomes merely a mask for the ruler's will. However, formalism alone is insufficient—axiology serves as the essential foundation for the legitimacy of the legal order.
Ronald Dworkin complements this vision by postulating the moral integrity of the legal order. In his view, law consists not only of rules but also of principles that a judge must interpret so that the system treats citizens with "equal concern and respect." Robert Alexy develops this as a theory of principles, treating them as optimization requirements that necessitate a continuous weighing of interests. The limit of this process is defined by the Radbruch Formula: when law becomes extremely unjust, it loses its normative character and ceases to be binding.
The Evolution of the Legal State in Polish Doctrine
In Poland, the jurisprudential content of the "legal state" clause is derived from Article 2 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Tribunal has transformed it into a meta-principle used to assess the rationality and proportionality of the legislator's actions. A key element here is the conviction that acquired rights build the citizen's trust in the state. The stability of the "rules of the game" is not a luxury, but a necessary condition for individuals to plan their lives without fear of arbitrary changes in the law.
The contemporary rule of law crisis has triggered a system adaptation in the form of diffuse judicial review. Common courts, seeking to protect the hierarchy of norms, increasingly refuse to apply provisions that are flagrantly inconsistent with the Constitution. This phenomenon demonstrates that the rule of law is not merely a ceremonial ritual of central organs, but a daily practice of the system's "shocks of conscience," in which a judge weighs fundamental values against the literal wording of a flawed statute.
Summary
Józef Nowacki’s thought proves that the rule of law is a process of integrating procedures with their axiological core. Law, once established, becomes a mirror reflecting the condition of society. Can we see within it not only formal procedures but also deeply rooted values? Or will we lose the spirit of justice in the pursuit of the letter of the law, condemning ourselves to the tyranny of legalism? Without trust and fidelity to constitutional values, the legal system becomes a mere empty shell, vulnerable to instrumentalization by any current power.
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