Introduction
This text analyzes the intellectual conflict between liberalism and post-liberalism. This dispute is not merely about the procedures of power, but concerns fundamental assumptions regarding human nature and the purpose of the state.
The reader will discover why the concept of political neutrality is being challenged by thinkers such as Deneen and Vermeule, as well as the risks associated with returning to a substantive understanding of the common good in the modern world.
The Common Good as a Substantive Goal of Politics
In contemporary times, the common good is often mistakenly equated with the sum of private benefits or GDP growth. Classical philosophy rejects this simplification.
For Aristotle, politics was an extension of teleological ethics. The state does not exist merely for survival, but to enable the good life and the cultivation of virtue within a community.
Thomas Aquinas treated bonum commune as a good that cannot be reduced to the summation of individual well-beings. It is an order of conditions that members of a community collectively maintain to achieve higher goals of human fulfillment.
The Tension Between Substantive Common Good and Liberal Neutrality
The classical conception posits that the state should actively promote specific moral goods. Liberalism responds to this with the idea of neutrality, intended to protect citizens from the imposition of a single doctrine within a pluralistic society.
According to John Rawls and the concept of public reason, constitutional principles should be justified in a manner acceptable to any reasonable citizen, regardless of their private metaphysical beliefs.
The dispute therefore centers on whether the state should act merely as a judge protecting individual autonomy, or as a pedagogue shaping the character of citizens according to an objective moral order.
The Illusion of Neutrality and the Mechanism of State Strengthening through Individualism
Post-liberalism contends that liberal neutrality is an illusion. By promoting individual autonomy over tradition and family, the state de facto creates an environment that favors a mobile and uprooted individual.
Patrick Deneen argues that the collapse of local communities does not increase freedom. Paradoxically, it strengthens central authority and the market, as individuals stripped of natural bonds become dependent on bureaucracy and capital.
In this way, the pursuit of full autonomy may lead to an increase in state power, as the government assumes the caregiving and norm-setting functions previously performed by intermediary communities.
Summary
We face a dilemma: whether to choose solitude in the name of autonomy, or the security of bonds at the cost of potential subordination. Each of these poles carries risk—from atomization to moral paternalism.
The key challenge is to find a synthesis that combines belonging with the possibility of dissent. We must build a community that protects against emptiness without simultaneously turning the citizen into an object of moral administration.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the common good in reality, and how did Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas understand it in contrast to contemporary interpretations?
Unlike contemporary interpretations, which understand the common good as the sum of private benefits or a set of institutional conditions for cooperation, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas perceived it as a value irreducible to the simple summation of individual well-beings. For Aristotle, it was linked to the possibility of a "good life" and the development of citizens' character within the community, whereas Aquinas treated it as a good arising from relations of mutual benefit, in which members of the community do not treat one another merely as means to private ends.
How does the classical conception of the common good differ from the liberal idea of state neutrality?
The classical conception of the common good links law with practical reason and the pursuit of human fulfillment, distinguishing moral judgment from the scope of legal coercion. In contrast, the liberal idea of neutrality assumes state restraint regarding controversial conceptions of the good life in the face of the reasonable pluralism of citizens' worldviews.
Does the liberal pursuit of individual autonomy actually limit state power, or could it paradoxically increase it?
The pursuit of individual autonomy can paradoxically increase state power because the collapse of local communities and family ties makes individuals more dependent on central institutions. The state expands its competencies at the moment when mediating communities lose their ability to perform caregiving and norm-setting functions.
How does post-liberal criticism of liberalism lead to the concept of a new elite and the risk of paternalism?
Post-liberal criticism assumes the replacement of the current liberal class with a new elite that will be guided by the common good rather than their own benefits. The risk of paternalism arises when this elite begins to distinguish the actual good of society from its momentary desires, justifying the limitation of citizens' choices by their own well-being.
How does the post-liberal approach to the common good translate into legal and constitutional practice?
In legal practice, this is manifested, among other things, in Adrian Vermeule's concept of common-good constitutionalism, which assumes the primacy of the communal goals of law over individual rights. This approach changes the role of the legal interpreter, who, instead of limiting themselves to the original meaning of the text, performs a moral interpretation based on classical legal tradition and the realization of fundamental political goals.
How do the various post-liberal currents differ, and what is the nature of their conflict with free-market mechanisms?
Post-liberal currents differ from one another; for example, integralism postulates the subordination of the state to the authority of the Church, while Deneen's approach focuses on the critique of individualism and elites. Their conflict with free-market mechanisms stems from the belief that the dynamics of capitalism ('creative destruction') destroy stable communities, the family, and local social bonds.
Why is the dispute between liberalism and post-liberalism not a simple conflict between community and egoism, and what dilemmas does the issue of virtues in the state generate?
This dispute is not a simple conflict between community and egoism because individual autonomy serves to protect the individual from the violence and tyranny of the community. The issue of virtues generates a dilemma: a free state relies on moral premises that it cannot produce itself through coercion without destroying its own liberal nature.
What are the main threats and internal contradictions associated with the return to a state based on the common good postulated by post-liberalists?
The main threats include a lack of control mechanisms over the interpretation of the common good, which could lead to constitutionalism being replaced by unlimited moral power. Internal contradictions manifest in the tension between the critique of technocratic bureaucracy and granting officials broad discretion, as well as in the conflict between the desire to rebuild local communities and the wish for top-down shaping of society by a strong state.
Can liberalism define the common good, and is it able to survive without moral foundations external to itself?
Liberalism can define the common good as the positive architecture of pluralism, including peace, the rule of law, and freedom of conscience. However, this system may require a substantive civic culture and virtues that law alone cannot enforce in order to reproduce the foundations necessary for its survival.
What are the main threats associated with implementing the post-liberal concept of the common good in political practice?
The main threats include the risk of authoritarianism, the personalization of power, and the creation of a new elite of interpreters who may abuse power in the name of the common good. There is also a danger that the moral prestige of this concept will serve as a screen for private interests or lead to the subordination of some citizens to a project defined by others.
How can the conflict between individual freedom and the need to belong to a community with specific values be resolved?
The solution is an institutional combination of belonging with the possibility of dissent, solidarity with autonomy, and the common good with individual rights. The challenge remains to construct a politics of the common good in such a way as not to turn the citizen into an object of moral administration.
