Introduction
This article analyzes the boundaries of criminal liability in the context of determinism and the so-called luck paradox (moral luck). The text examines whether a human being can be held responsible for their actions if they are not the absolute source of those actions.
The reader will discover that guilt does not require metaphysical freedom, but rather specific cognitive competencies. We will explore how contemporary philosophy and empirical sciences are redefining the concept of agency within criminal law.
Responsibility Does Not Require Metaphysical Choice
An individual can be held responsible for an act even if determinism precludes the possibility of having acted otherwise. The key is a shift from the requirement of alternative possibilities toward an analysis of the actual sequence, or the actual way in which the action came to be.
A primary example is the thought experiment known as the Frankfurt case. It demonstrates that a perpetrator remains responsible if the act stems from their own decision-making process, even if an external manipulator would have prevented any other choice from being made.
Therefore, the fact that we are not the absolute source of our traits (determinism) does not exclude guilt. Responsibility is based on the authorship of the action, rather than a metaphysical ability to create oneself from scratch.
Compatibilism as a Solution to the Dilemma Between Determinism and Chance
The mere existence of causes—or their absence in the form of randomness—does not resolve the question of guilt. If a decision were entirely random, the subject would lose control over it just as they would in the case of blind determinism.
Compatibilism posits that the freedom necessary for responsibility coexists with causal order. Control does not consist in the absence of causes, but rather in ensuring that our beliefs and reasons are those causes.
The law can assign guilt to a biologically conditioned human being by distinguishing deliberation from coercion or hypnosis. It is sufficient that the decision-making mechanism is functional and has not been pathologically impaired.
Responsibility as the Capacity for Reasons-Responsiveness
Criminal liability is justified by guidance control, which is the ability to recognize and respond to reasons (reasons-responsiveness). We do not need to be the absolute source of our decisions to participate in normative relationships.
Contemporary knowledge of the brain and environment shows that agency exists on a spectrum. Neuroscientific discoveries, such as Libet's experiments, do not negate guilt, as they concern arbitrary movements rather than complex moral decisions.
The law should examine the actual quality of cognitive control and the capacity for reflective revision of norms. Guilt is attributed to a subject who understands prohibitions and is capable of directing their behavior in accordance with them.
Summary
Responsibility is not a gift of metaphysical sovereignty, but a fragile capacity to be a partner within the normative order of the world. Freedom is not an escape from fate, but the reflective guidance of oneself within its limitations.
We remain suspended between the fallacy of being an absolute author and the illusion of being a passive product of causes. The law must accept the human being who is not the god of their own biography, but rather its conscious and responsible participant.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a person be held responsible for their action if, due to determinism, they could not have acted otherwise?
Yes, responsibility does not necessarily require the metaphysical possibility of having acted otherwise, but rather a proper kind of authorship of the action. According to the compatibilist approach and Frankfurt's argument, what is key is whether the act flowed from the perpetrator's own decision-making process and whether they were able to understand reasons and respond to them.
Why does the mere existence of causes or their absence (randomness) not resolve the issue of criminal responsibility?
The mere presence of causes (determinism) or their absence in the form of randomness does not resolve the issue of responsibility, because both states can undermine the perpetrator's control. Responsibility depends on the type of causality—an act is free not when it lacks causes, but when it results from the subject's beliefs and reasons, rather than from coercion or chance.
How can criminal responsibility be justified if a human being is not the absolute source of their decisions?
Criminal responsibility can be justified through the concept of guidance control, according to which guilt does not require being the absolute source of a decision, but rather possessing a decision-making mechanism sensitive to reasons. A person is responsible if they can cognitively recognize normative reasons (receptivity) and modify their behavior under their influence (reactivity).
Does the fact that we are not the absolute source of our traits and decisions (determinism) exclude our criminal responsibility?
The lack of absolute authorship of one's own traits does not exclude responsibility, as it is not a necessary condition for its attribution. It is sufficient that a person possesses a rationally functioning mechanism of action that allows them to understand reasons, restrain impulses, and act based on their own judgments.
How can control over one's own actions be understood if we are not the absolute authors of our character and circumstances?
Control can be understood as the competence of normative self-guidance and the relationship between the subject and available reasons, rather than as absolute dominion over the world. Responsibility then concerns practices of self-regulation and the management of one's own dispositions, as well as the ability to respond to reasons in a given situation, rather than the metaphysical authorship of the initial character.
Does criminal responsibility require metaphysical free will, or is the capacity to participate in normative relations sufficient?
Criminal responsibility does not require resolving the metaphysical issue of free will or determinism, but is based on the perpetrator's ability to participate in normative relations. The subject's normative competence—the ability to understand prohibitions, respond to arguments, and guide action according to accepted rules—is sufficient.
How can criminal liability and guilt be justified if our values and decisions are conditioned by external factors or socialization?
Criminal liability can be justified through the perpetrator's capacity for reflective revision of their values, which allows for a distinction between autonomous appropriation of norms and passive programming. Instead of seeking a metaphysical source of freedom, the focus is on examining the structure of control at the personal level and the individual's ability to critically compare and modify beliefs derived from external sources.
How can the law assign criminal liability, taking into account human biological and social conditioning?
The law should assign criminal liability based on agency control, meaning the degree of actual self-direction and the subject's capacity to respond to reasons. Responsibility does not require absolute independence from biological and social causes, but is proportional to the quality of a person's normative agency.
How can criminal law assign guilt, given that humans are biologically and socially conditioned?
Criminal law is based on the theory of sufficient agency, according to which a person is responsible for an act when they possess the capacity to understand and respond to reasons. Responsibility does not require absolute independence from biological and social conditioning, but consists in developing the capacity for reflective self-direction within those constraints.
Do discoveries in neuroscience and psychology (e.g., Libet's experiments) prove a lack of free will and thereby eliminate criminal liability?
No, the results of Libet's experiments do not prove a lack of free will nor do they eliminate criminal liability. Modern neuroscience challenges the interpretation that the readiness potential is unambiguous evidence of a decision being made before the intention becomes conscious.
Can the results of neuroscientific experiments on spontaneous decisions (e.g., moving a finger) serve as a basis for eliminating criminal liability for serious crimes?
No, because spontaneous movements are arbitrary decisions lacking deeper content and planning, which distinguishes them from serious crimes requiring intent and deliberation. The results of research on simple movements cannot be generalized to morally significant decisions, as they measure motor initiation rather than the mechanism of complex decision-making.
How does the influence of the environment and social context modify the traditional understanding of individual responsibility for one's actions?
The traditional understanding of responsibility is replaced by a model of co-agency, in which agency is embedded in the interaction between the individual and the environment. Responsibility encompasses not only the act itself, but also prior decisions regarding the design of one's surroundings and the avoidance of risky situations (diachronic responsibility). At the same time, it is recognized that the capacities for self-regulation and shaping context are distributed unequally across society.
Does the fact that our behavior depends on the situation and many external causes mean that we cannot be held responsible for it?
No, situational influence does not negate responsibility, but rather changes how it is understood—as the ability to recognize and act upon reasons under specific conditions. Causality and responsibility are not identical; therefore, knowledge of the external determinants of behavior does not automatically dilute guilt.
How should empirical sciences and predictive tools be utilized in criminal law to avoid violating the principle of justice?
Empirical sciences should serve to build a realistic standard of care by analyzing the perpetrator's access to information and cognitive loads. Predictive tools can support risk management and protective measures, but they cannot replace the assessment of guilt nor be used to impose penalties for statistically predicted behaviors.
Does the fact that science can predict our behavior or point to its neuronal underpinnings mean that we are not responsible for it?
No, because the predictability of behavior and control over it are logically distinct, and rational actions can be extremely predictable. Preconscious neuronal activity does not prove that free will is an illusion, as it may be part of a decision-making process that extends in time beyond the single moment of executing a movement.
How do empirical sciences and the concept of plasticity influence the understanding of guilt and criminal responsibility?
Empirical sciences and the concept of plasticity indicate that agency is an unevenly distributed and dynamic resource, suggesting the replacement of rigid determinism with the individualization of guilt. Criminal responsibility should be based on a gradable capacity for agency, taking into account the subject's ability to recognize and change their dispositions as well as their real possibilities for controlling them.
How does contemporary scientific knowledge of the brain and environment influence the understanding of criminal responsibility?
Contemporary scientific knowledge rejects the concept of an absolutely sovereign will in favor of a model of the person as a causal and reflective system capable of responding to reasons. Criminal responsibility thus shifts from a metaphysical question about free will toward an analysis of the perpetrator's actual capacities to understand, inhibit, and plan behaviors within a specific environment.
How does contemporary knowledge of the causes of human action influence the concept of guilt and criminal responsibility?
Contemporary knowledge of the causes of human action shifts the concept of responsibility from metaphysical freedom toward complex empirical agency. Causal explanation is not identical to a moral verdict; therefore, criminal responsibility should decrease not with every new explanation, but only in the event that an actual limitation of self-guidance capacity is revealed.
