Introduction
The world is entering a phase of so-called turmoil—a transition between an institutional order and a new era of brutal realism. This article analyzes the thought of John Andrews, who points to the return of the material physicality of power in the digital age.
Readers will discover why geography and raw materials are once again determining the politics of great powers. You will also learn how economic interdependence has become a tool for pressure and where the limits of international law lie when faced with the potency of force.
The Return of Realism and the Material Physicality of Power
According to Andrews, contemporary geopolitics is the art of recognizing the real constraints of space. It has become critical because the illusion of a borderless world has collided with the reality of wars and energy crises.
The key is materiality—the fact that goods and armies do not move at the speed of information. Examples include undersea cables or pipelines; although the world is digital, its foundations remain physical.
Power today is the ability to induce specific behaviors in others by controlling resources and territories. This marks a return to a logic where a political decision is only real if the means to execute it exist.
Interdependence as a Structure of Vulnerability and a Tool of Power
Global interdependence has not eliminated great power rivalry, but rather changed its nature. Instead of solely fostering peace, it has created a network of vulnerabilities, where every node can become an instrument of pressure.
Those who control technology, currency, or trade routes possess tools of coercion without the need for territorial occupation. Asymmetric interdependence allows the stronger player to engage in economic blackmail.
In this context, international law often becomes merely a tool in the hands of great powers. Norms exist, but their enforceability depends on the distribution of power and the costs associated with violating those rules.
Power as the Ability to Shape the Behavior of Others
The morality of a state differs from that of an individual; a leader cannot sacrifice millions of citizens for ethical ideals. In geopolitics, power is the ability to impose one's own interpretation of reality.
The potency of great powers manifests in combining hard power (military coercion) with soft power (cultural attraction) and Tyber power. The most effective actor is the one who makes their own interest appear to be a common interest.
Nuclear deterrence serves as an example—force is most effective when it does not have to be used. However, weaponry alone is insufficient; credibility and the political willingness to employ it are essential.
Summary
We live in a world where law and force overlap. Law without agency becomes a mere request, while pure coercion is too costly and inefficient.
Are we capable of building a new order, or are we simply decorating an ancient mechanism of power? The challenge for democracies remains the question of the price of freedom in an era of instantaneous effects.
Ultimately, it is not the map that determines us, but our ability to build community with those whom we perceive as strangers.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is contemporary geopolitics from the perspective of John Andrews, and why has it become relevant again?
From John Andrews' perspective, contemporary geopolitics is the art of recognizing the significance of territory, resources, and physical power in a world dominated by the illusion of digital networks. It has become relevant again because goods, energy, and armies do not move at the speed of information, and state security still depends on the control of specific space and infrastructure.
Why has global economic and legal interdependence not eliminated classical great power rivalry?
Global interdependence creates a structure of vulnerability in which elements of supply chains and technologies become instruments of pressure and tools of power. Great power rivalry persists because there is a gap between the applicability of law and the possibility of its enforcement, especially when norms conflict with a state's existential interest.
How does state morality differ from individual morality, and how should the concept of power be understood in geopolitics?
Individual morality is based on the personal cost of beliefs, whereas state morality is more complex and pragmatic, as decisions are made on behalf of millions of people. In geopolitics, power is the ability to induce others to behave in ways they would not have otherwise, which includes both military coercion (hard power) and cultural or technological attractiveness (soft and cyber power).
Why has the modern world stopped functioning according to the principles of liberal democracy, and how is great power potency understood today?
The modern world has moved away from the principles of liberal democracy because trade did not eliminate strategic rivalry, and economic development and technology did not lead to universal political liberalization. Great power potency is now understood as control over key links in the global system, such as cloud infrastructure, operating systems, artificial intelligence, or advanced semiconductors.
Do international law and institutions such as the UN actually limit the power of great powers, or are they merely tools in their hands?
The international system combines the legal equality of states with the political recognition of great power potency, an example of which is the veto power of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. This mechanism stems from the realism of the order's architects, who recognized that a normative order could not be maintained against the strongest participants in the system.
Why is international law unable to effectively restrain the most powerful states?
The effectiveness of international law depends on whether the violation of norms triggers sufficiently severe consequences, and the potential of entities capable of enforcing these rules is unequal. The greater the asymmetry of power between the perpetrator and the restraining body, the greater the risk of a gap emerging between the legal norm and reality.
What is the difference between possessing weapons and having a real capacity to deter an opponent?
The mere possession of resources is not equivalent to real deterrence, because force must be not only possessed but also credible and politically feasible to employ. Effective deterrence consists in convincing the opponent of the likelihood that force will be used to alter their risk calculus, which distinguishes declared security from self-enforcing security.
Why do powers with an enormous military advantage lose wars against theoretically weaker opponents?
Material superiority does not guarantee victory because war is a conflict of will, logistics, and political resilience, rather than a competition in summing up armaments. Powers may lose due to the asymmetry of the opponent's determination and the dynamic nature of clashes, in which original models and strategic plans cease to be relevant.
What is the relationship between the brute force of great powers and the functioning of international law?
The power of great powers provides the backing that enables law to exist, organizing coercion so that violating common rules is less profitable than adhering to them. A norm without material agency becomes merely a political request; however, force devoid of norms degenerates into pure coercion and does not ensure the stability of order.
Has globalization made geography and physical territory irrelevant to the global economy?
No, globalization has not eliminated the importance of geography and territory, but has instead made space more complex. The modern economy remains heavily dependent on so-called choke points, such as the Strait of Hormuz or Malacca, whose blockade affects global commodity prices and trade security.
Why can a state's economic success paradoxically increase its strategic vulnerability?
Economic success based on trade and raw material imports makes a state's prosperity dependent on the openness of maritime communication routes located outside its territory. The growth of wealth thus expands the area of strategic interests, requiring the protection of ports, straits, and logistical bases in distant parts of the world.
How can physical geography and the structure of global trade be used as tools of political pressure?
Physical geography allows asymmetric actors to impose costs on more powerful entities by blocking key trade corridors, which acts as a force multiplier. Meanwhile, the structure of global trade enables the use of asymmetric interdependence as a tool of coercion, where the dominant party in the supply chain can achieve political goals without deploying an army.
In the era of digitalization and globalization, do traditional geography and territory still matter for the power of states?
Yes, geography and territory remain crucial because modern power relies on material infrastructure, such as data centers, undersea cables, or semiconductor factories. Although technology changes the value of specific spaces, the digital world remains dependent on physical resources and their strategic location.
How does geography influence the political decisions of great powers, and why has globalization not eliminated the significance of territory?
Geography determines available strategies and the costs of actions; however, it is the interpretation of spatial facts by great powers that gives them political meaning. Globalization did not eliminate the importance of territory but instead created a new geopolitics in which control over physical hubs, pipelines, and flow routes of goods became key.
Why could the rise of China's power lead to war with the USA, even if neither side directly desires conflict?
Conflict may result from the so-called Thucydides Trap—a structural tension that arises when a rising power (China) challenges the position of the dominant power (USA). War does not have to be the result of aggressive intentions, but rather fear of future loss of advantage, which can make a preemptive strike seem rational.
Why is the rivalry between the USA and China not merely a dispute over resources, but an ideological and identity-based conflict?
The conflict has an ideological dimension because China has demonstrated that modernization and economic success can be achieved without adopting the Western model of liberal democracy. This rivalry is also based on identity narratives of national rebirth and lost greatness, meaning that concessions are perceived not as transactions, but as national humiliation.
Why does the contemporary rivalry between the USA and China not end in a total severance of economic relations, despite growing military and technological tensions?
Economic relations are not completely severed because the economic interdependence of both states remains immense, and breaking cooperation in certain areas would be too costly. The rivalry consists rather of reducing vulnerabilities while maintaining key elements of trade exchange.
How can the mutual pursuit of security and alliance systems lead great powers into an unplanned war?
The pursuit of security can trigger a spiral of tension, where one side's armaments are misinterpreted by the other as a threat, leading to a mutual increase in military potential. Additionally, alliance systems can transform a local incident or a peripheral crisis into a major war through the mechanism of transmitting commitments between partners.
Does the possession of nuclear weapons by great powers prevent war, or does it merely change the form of their conflict?
Nuclear weapons act as a stabilizer, preventing direct clashes between great powers due to the unimaginable cost of such a war. At the same time, they do not eliminate conflict but shift it to the realm of rivalry below the threshold of total war, encompassing proxy wars, economic pressure, and cyber and intelligence operations.
What determines that a great power loses its position, and is there a life cycle of empires?
Great powers may lose their position due to an internal loss of energy, cohesion, innovativeness, or the ability to bear the costs of their own existence. Power is a process with a life cycle that leads from pioneering and development, through wealth, to decadence and collapse.
Why might wealthy and technologically advanced societies lose the ability for effective collective action?
Wealthy societies lose the capacity for collective action because success and security lead to the fading memory of the risks and efforts that made their creation possible. As institutions develop, direct solidarity is replaced by bureaucracy and procedures, causing the community to stop understanding the necessity of bearing the costs of maintaining the system.
Do repeatable life cycles of empires exist, and is the fall of a superpower inevitable after a certain period of time?
There is no recognized historical law stating that the fall of a superpower is inevitable after a specific amount of time. Although some theories suggest the existence of repeatable cycles and an average duration of power around 250 years, these are treated as heuristics rather than laws of nature, as states possess the capacity for reform and regeneration.
What are the disadvantages and advantages of strong centralization of power in the context of decision-making?
Strong centralization allows for faster decision-making and mobilization, but it can block the flow of negative information to the top of the system. As a result, this speed applies to both correct and catastrophic choices.
What determines whether a superpower will survive an internal crisis and be able to implement a long-term strategy?
The survival of a superpower is determined by social cohesion (ʿasabijja), understood as the ability to maintain a minimum strategic consensus and recognize the rules of the game even amidst deep differences in opinion. It is crucial to have institutions that link changes in power with strategic continuity, enabling thinking beyond the immediate political cycle.
Why are modern democracies becoming susceptible to the temptation of authoritarianism, and how does their internal structure affect their capacity for collective action?
Modern democracies become susceptible to authoritarianism when citizens accustomed to the speed of the digital world stop valuing democratic safeguards and procedures, perceiving them merely as delays. In this situation, the offer of strong leadership becomes attractive, promising simplicity and quick decisions instead of complex discussions and compromises.
Why is democracy, despite its slowness and chaos, systemically safer than authoritarianism?
Democracy is safer because, through the separation of powers and media pluralism, it possesses mechanisms for correcting erroneous decisions. In contrast to authoritarianism, which centralizes the risk of error and promotes loyalty over truth, a democratic system treats freedom of speech and opposition as tools for auditing and providing reliable information.
Why are preventive measures often politically unprofitable for those in power?
Prevention is politically thankless because the success of preventive actions removes the evidence of their necessity. Voters do not reward politicians for disasters that did not happen, as these provide neither dramatic images nor concrete proof of lives saved.
Why are modern democracies becoming susceptible to autocratization, and how is the attitude of new generations toward this system changing?
Modern democracies are becoming susceptible to autocratization due to deep polarization, which leads to treating institutions as tools of combat and defining political opponents as existential enemies. New generations do not exhibit a uniform attitude toward this system; however, some of them are losing their emotional bond with democracy, evaluating it primarily through the prism of delivered results and quality of life.
Why are modern democracies becoming susceptible to populism and authoritarianism despite the lack of direct military threat?
Modern democracies become susceptible to authoritarianism when they lose effectiveness in solving citizens' basic problems. In such a situation, populists can present democratic safeguards and limits on power as obstacles to efficient governance, facilitating the dismantling of institutions under the banner of "fixing" them.
