The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a complex web of trauma, national aspirations, and territorial dependencies. Traditional attempts to resolve it often fail because they focus on only one dimension of the problem.
In this article, we analyze peace models through the lens of Shlaim's thought. You will discover why simple partitions are insufficient and how a hybrid model can reconcile sovereignty with the inevitable interdependence of both nations.
Criteria for Evaluating Peace Models and the Two-State Foundation
An effective peace model cannot be merely morally appealing. It must simultaneously resolve issues of security, self-determination, the status of Jerusalem, and refugee rights.
The classic two-state model envisions the creation of two independent and democratic political entities. Its foundation rests on the pre-1967 lines, with Jerusalem serving as a shared capital.
A technical example of this plan's implementation is the Geneva Accord. It proposes a 1:1 land swap, intended to allow for the retention of major settlement blocks while ensuring the territorial continuity of a Palestinian state.
The Two-State Model Reduces Power Struggles but Generates Immense Spatial Costs
The primary advantage of partition is that it transforms a struggle over the entirety of the territory into a dispute over a specific border. This allows both nations to achieve segment al autosomy—their own self-determination within separate spaces.
However, geographical reality stands as an obstacle. Extensive settlement growth and infrastructure have created a deeply intertwined layout, making it difficult to draw a simple line of division.
Implementing this model would require costly spatial reconstruction and the relocation of settlers. This is a sociological problem, not merely a cartographic one, as it involves deep emotional and religious ties of the inhabitants.
Limitations of the Classic Two-State Model
Traditional partition falters when faced with the refugee problem and the indivisibility of Jerusalem. Complete separation could prove organizationally and economically dysfunctional.
An alternative is a confederation, such as the A Land for All initiative. This assumes two sovereign states that share a common homeland. The key here is the decoupling of citizenship from place of residence.
This model allows for the joint management of common-pool resources, such as water and energy. Consequently, it is possible to maintain national identity while achieving functional integration, reducing the need for mass evacuations.
Summary
The most realistic solution is a hybrid model. It proposes first establishing hard sovereignty and borders, followed by the construction of a confederal superstructure for shared affairs.
Such an institutionalization of interdependent distinctness combines freedom from domination with geographical realities. This avoids the pitfalls of a single-state solution as well as the risky management of the status quo.
Ultimately, however, no architecture will work without cultural transformation. The true challenge lies in creating a political culture where no national myth justifies the annihilation of another human being's agency.
📚 Based on
Israel and Palestine Reappraisals Revisions Refutations Avi Shlaim
👤 About the book's author
Avi Shlaim
University of Oxford
Avi Shlaim (born October 31, 1945) is an Iraqi-born British and Israeli historian and Professor Emeritus of International Relations at the University of Oxford, where he is an emeritus fellow of St Antony's College. Born in Baghdad, Shlaim grew up in Israel and later completed his higher education at the University of Cambridge, the London School of Economics, and the University of Reading. He is widely recognized as one of the leading figures among Israel's "New Historians," a group of scholars who utilized declassified archival records to critically re-examine standard Zionist historical narratives regarding the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His scholarly research centers on Middle Eastern diplomacy, British imperial policy, and Israeli foreign and defense policy. Shlaim was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 2006.
Mind map: The Institutional Anatomy of Peace: Models of Sovereignty and Interdependence
Evaluation Criteria and the Two-State Model
Analysis of costs and risks over moral appeal
Resolving issues of self-determination, security, and territory
Classic model: two sovereign states within 1967 borders
Jerusalem as a shared capital for both independent states
One-to-one territorial swaps
Spatial Advantages and Costs of Two States
Reducing power conflicts to border disputes
Self-determination without constant demographic recalculations
Overlapping jurisdictions complicating separation
High costs of settler relocation and spatial reconstruction
Sunk cost theory increasing political exit costs
Limitations of the Classic Two-State Model
The refugee problem and the right to historical justice
Conflict between full restitution and current social realities
Applying 'transitional justice' to property compensation
Dysfunctionality of total territorial separation in Jerusalem
Inadequacy of binary 'return or no return' schemes
Confederation as a Solution to the Separation Dilemma
Two sovereign states linked by a confederal structure
Decoupling citizenship from actual place of residence
Shared sovereignty over resources and mobility
Right of residency in the second state without changing citizenship
Reducing the zero-sum nature of the settler dispute
Confederation as a Supplement to Sovereignty
Separating concepts of homeland, state, and political sovereignty
Joint management of 'common-pool resources'
Aligning institutional functions with the scale of the problem
Requirement for high institutional trust for free movement
Phased approach: sovereignty first, then gradual functional integration
One State and Collective Rights
Model of one democratic state with full civic equality
Transition from 'ethnos' politics to 'demos' politics
Conflict between individual rights and national aspirations
Concept of consociational democracy and proportional representation
Securing collective rights over pure individualist liberalism
Risks and Asymmetries of One State
Institutionalization of identity leading to decision paralysis
Deep asymmetry in capital, military, and security apparatus
Threats to Jewish self-determination via demographic shifts
Palestinian fear of formal equality without real power
Risk of ethnic 'tyranny of the majority' in unitary systems
The One-State Trap and Conflict Management
Lack of a political transition path to one state
Conflict management instead of final resolution
Protecting the status quo as a high strategic risk
Incompatibility of permanent occupation with international law and ICJ
October 7 events exposed failure of Gaza isolation strategy
The Hybrid Model as a Synthesis
Layered construction: sovereign states with a confederal superstructure
Separation of political sovereignty from integrated governance
Two citizenship systems with shared technical bodies
Settler residency in Palestine contingent on legal acceptance
New refugee approach: right of residence without citizenship
Operationalizing the Hybrid Model in Practice
Joint metropolitan authority for an open Jerusalem
Necessity of a Palestinian monopoly on legitimate violence
International verification systems and external border monitoring
Building symmetric economic interdependence in the region
Memory reconstruction through mutual recognition of national traumas
Institutionalizing Interdependent Distinctness as Peace
Criteria: equality of persons, self-determination, and institutional resilience
Sequence: borders and sovereignty first, then open borders
Avoiding the 'Oslo error' by defining sovereignty before integration
Evolution from political separation toward functional integration
Peace as the institutionalization of interdependent distinctness
📖 Glossary
Pooled sovereignty
Koncepcja suwerenności współdzielonej, w której państwa przekazują wybrane funkcje organom wspólnym, zachowując jednocześnie swoją niezależność.
Segmental autonomy
Model organizacji politycznej, w którym różne grupy etniczne lub narodowe posiadają własne przestrzenie decyzyjne w sprawach tożsamościowych.
Complex interdependence
Sytuacja, w której państwa są ze sobą powiązane wieloma kanałami (gospodarczymi, społecznymi), co zwiększa koszt podjęcia decyzji o konflikcie zbrojnym.
Transitional justice
Sprawiedliwość transformacyjna; procesy prawne i społeczne mające na celu rozliczenie krzywd z przeszłości w celu budowy stabilnego pokoju.
Common-pool resources
Zasoby wspólne (np. wody gruntowe), których efektywne zarządzanie wymaga koordynacji wielu podmiotów, aby uniknąć ich nadmiernej eksploatacji.
Path dependence
Zależność od obranej ścieżki; zjawisko, w którym wcześniejsze decyzje i inwestycje ograniczają dostępne opcje w przyszłości i utrudniają zmianę kursu.
Frequently Asked Questions
What criteria should be used to evaluate possible conflict resolutions, and what does the classic two-state model entail?
Conflict resolution solutions should be evaluated not through the lens of moral attractiveness, but by their ability to simultaneously resolve a series of interdependent issues and by comparing cost and risk structures. The classic two-state model assumes the creation of two independent, sovereign, and democratic states with territorial continuity, based on the pre-1967 lines, with Jerusalem as the capital of both.
What are the main advantages and obstacles to implementing the two-state model in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
The main advantage of the two-state model is the reduction of a conflict over the entirety of the territory to a border dispute, allowing both nations to exercise their own self-determination within separate decision-making spaces. However, an obstacle is the strong territorial and infrastructural intertwining after 1967 and the growth of settlements, which would necessitate costly spatial reconstruction and the relocation of residents.
What are the main obstacles to implementing the classic two-state model?
The primary obstacles are population issues, including the necessity of relocating or evacuating settlers, as well as resolving the problem of Palestinian refugees and their right of return. An additional challenge is the status of Jerusalem, which exposes the limitations of the traditional logic of territorial division of sovereignty.
Why might a traditional division into two states be insufficient, and what is the alternative that avoids complete separation?
Traditional division may be insufficient due to deep economic interdependencies as well as religious, demographic, and infrastructural intertwining in Jerusalem, where total separation would be dysfunctional. An alternative is a model of two sovereign states linked by a confederal structure, which assumes the sharing of selected functions (e.g., water resources or mobility) and the decoupling of citizenship from place of residence.
How does the confederal model solve the problem of sharing land and resources while maintaining national distinctness?
This model separates the concepts of homeland, state, and sovereignty, recognizing the land as a common homeland for both nations while dividing political sovereignty between two states. This allows for the preservation of ties to sites of historical significance and the joint management of resources (e.g., water and energy) through cross-border regulatory bodies.
Is the creation of one democratic state for Israelis and Palestinians a realistic solution to the conflict?
The creation of a single democratic state based on individual equality is a morally and liberally coherent solution, but it may not satisfy the national aspirations of both communities for self-determination. A sociologically more realistic variant is a binational state or a consociational democracy, which guarantees collective rights and autonomy for both groups instead of a pure 'one person, one vote' formula.
Why is the one-state solution for Israel and Palestine so difficult to implement in practice?
The main difficulty is the deep asymmetry of potentials between the two groups and the necessity for a fundamental systemic change in Israel, which could be perceived as the liquidation of its primary function. Additionally, this model raises concerns about the lack of lasting demographic and political dominance for either side within a system of full democracy.
Why are the one-state model and the conflict management strategy insufficient or risky in the current political situation?
The one-state model is risky due to the drastic decline in mutual trust and the absence of a political transition path, which would require a profound change in the identity of both societies. Meanwhile, the conflict management strategy has proven insufficient, as the events of October 7th exposed the weakness of isolating the problem, and in the long run, it generates high legal and social costs.
Which solution best combines the national aspirations of both sides with the realities of territorial and functional interdependence?
The best solution is a layered construction of two sovereign states with confederal elements, based on the 1967 borders. This model assumes the separation of political sovereignty while simultaneously integrating the management of interdependent areas, such as water resources, infrastructure, or Jerusalem.
In practice, how would the functioning of a hybrid model look regarding disputed issues such as Jerusalem, security, or mutual historical recognition?
Jerusalem could be partially managed jointly by a metropolitan body, while recognizing Israel's sovereignty over Jewish neighborhoods and Palestine's over Arab ones. Security would require a Palestinian monopoly on violence (excluding armed groups) and international verification and monitoring systems. Regarding historical issues, it is necessary to mutually recognize the suffering of both sides and develop a common set of facts while maintaining a pluralism of memory.
Which model for resolving the conflict is the most realistic and on what principles should it be based?
The most realistic solution is a two-level political construction, based on the foundation of two sovereign states and a superstructure in the form of a gradually developed confederal space of cooperation. This model assumes the institutionalization of interdependent distinctness, combining the sovereignty necessary to avoid dominance with functional cooperation where total separation is impossible.
Related Questions
What criteria should be used to evaluate possible conflict resolutions, and what does the classic two-state model entail?
What are the main advantages and obstacles to implementing the two-state model in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
What are the primary obstacles to implementing the classic two-state model?
Why might the traditional division into two states be insufficient, and what is the alternative that allows for avoiding total separation?
How does a confederation model solve the problem of sharing land and resources while maintaining national distinctiveness?
Is the creation of a single democratic state for Israelis and Palestinians a realistic solution to the conflict?
Why is a one-state solution for Israel and Palestine so difficult to implement in practice?
Why are the one-state model and conflict management strategies insufficient or risky in the current political situation?
Which solution best combines the national aspirations of both sides with the realities of territorial and functional interdependence?
In practice, how would a hybrid model function regarding disputed issues such as Jerusalem, security, or mutual historical recognition?
🧠 Thematic Groups
Teoria i fundamenty instytucjonalne: analiza modeli dwupaństwowego, konfederacyjnego oraz jednego państwa w kontekście prawa międzynarodowego i teorii nacjonalizmu.
Wyzwania przestrzenne i demograficzne: problem osadnictwa, status Jerozolimy, kwestia uchodźców oraz wpływ infrastruktury na wykonalność podziału terytorialnego.
Mechanizmy współpracy i bezpieczeństwa: koncepcja suwerenności współdzielonej, zarządzanie dobrami wspólnymi (woda, energia) oraz wymóg monopolu bezpieczeństwa.
Psychologia pokoju i transformacja narracji: rola wzajemnego uznania cierpienia, pluralizm pamięci oraz przejście od konkurencji narracji do partnerstwa.
