Introduction
This text analyzes the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict between 1977 and 1988. It focuses on the paradox in which diplomatic success with Egypt failed to translate into peace with the Palestinians.
The reader will discover why a rational exchange of land for security worked between states, yet failed in a dispute rooted in identity. The article explains how military dominance and occupation paradoxically consolidated Palestinian resistance.
The Camp David Asymmetry: State Recognition vs. Palestinian Status
The Camp David Accords created an asymmetry between the fate of Egypt and that of Palestine. Peace with Cairo was possible because both parties negotiated a clearly defined goal: the return of the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for the normalization of relations.
Regarding the Palestinian issue, there was a lack of a recognized partner. Israel refused to grant legitimacy to the PLO, treating it as a terrorist organization. Instead of a concrete objective, only a vague transitional mechanism and administrative autonomy were established.
This model failed because the Palestinians did not possess a sovereign state with a clear mandate to sign a treaty. The absence of an agreed-upon representation became an insurmountable barrier.
Peace as a Result of Interest Calculation, Not Emotion
Israel was able to return the Sinai because the peninsula held high strategic value but low biblical or national significance. For Menachem Begin, it did not constitute the core of Eretz Israel.
The situation in the West Bank was different. Judea and Samaria held deep religious and identity-based significance. Here, territorial compromise struck at the foundations of the national narrative, rendering it politically impossible.
Settlement in these areas served as a strategic commitment. By dispersing Jewish communities, Israel employed a policy of tying its own hands, consciously increasing the future costs of any potential withdrawal from these lands.
Peace as a Shift in the Structure of Interests
The durability of the Egyptian-Israeli peace stemmed from a shift in the structure of benefits. Egypt recovered its territory, and Israel eliminated the strongest Arab army from the front lines.
However, this success altered the regional balance of power. The exclusion of Egypt made the Palestinian conflict more asymmetrical. The military defeat of the PLO in Lebanon in 1982 did not solve the problem but rather triggered a substitution effect.
In the vacuum left by the PLO, Hezbollah emerged, while internal frustration led to the first Intifada. This proved that eliminating an organization does not eliminate a national claim. The Oslo Accords only became possible after the strategic exhaustion of all other alternatives.
Summary
The history of 1977–1988 shows that the rationality of peace is often born from the painful conviction that every other path leads nowhere. Peace did not require sympathy, but rather the exhaustion of all means of combat.
However, a question remains: can an agreement reached in an atmosphere of hopelessness and without agreed-upon borders survive? The risk is high when new spoilers, fueled by identity-based anger, enter the fray.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why was the agreement with Egypt possible, while the Palestinian issue remained unresolved within the framework of Camp David?
The agreement with Egypt was possible thanks to a clear exchange of security and normalization for the return of the Sinai, which before 1967 belonged to a sovereign state. The Palestinian issue remained unresolved because the dispute over the nature of future sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza was more complex, and negotiations concerned only a transitional mechanism without resolving the final status.
Why was Israel able to return Sinai, but unable to do the same in the case of the Palestinian territories?
Begin could return Sinai because he did not consider it part of the historical core of the Jewish homeland to the same extent as Judea and Samaria. In the case of the Palestinian territories, compromise was more difficult as they are linked to identity, which meant Begin accepted only a model of self-governance there instead of full sovereignty.
Why did the peace between Egypt and Israel prove to be lasting, and how did it affect the situation in the region and within those states?
The peace proved durable due to a change in the interest structure of both states and economic and military support from the USA, which made breaking the agreement too costly. In the region, this increased stability but made the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more asymmetrical. Within the states, it led to Egypt's isolation and the death of President Sadat, while in Israel, it coincided with social and political shifts that enabled Likud's victory.
Why did settlement in the West Bank differ from that in Sinai, and what political function did it serve?
Settlement in the West Bank differed from that in Sinai due to the higher biblical-national value of Judea and Samaria compared to the primarily military value of Sinai. It served a political function by blocking territorial compromises through the creation of faits accomplis, which was intended to hinder any future division of territory and increase the cost of potential diplomatic concessions.
Why did the negotiation model used with Egypt not work in the case of the Palestinians?
The main difference was the lack of agreed-upon representation and legitimacy of the partner; while Sadat represented a recognized state, the Palestinians were represented by the PLO, which Israel regarded as a terrorist organization. Additionally, the PLO's strategy of violence shifted the perception of the Palestinian cause from national aspirations to a security problem, destroying moral capital and hindering negotiations.
Did the military defeat of the PLO in Lebanon in 1982 lead to the resolution of the Palestinian conflict?
No, the military defeat of the PLO in 1982 did not lead to the resolution of the conflict, as the organization survived. Although it was pushed out of Lebanon and suffered a massive military blow, the PLO remained politically and militarily active.
Why did the military defeat of the PLO and Israeli dominance not lead to the end of the conflict, but rather to the outbreak of the first intifada?
Israel's military superiority did not end the conflict because removing specific organizations (such as the PLO) did not eliminate the structural dissatisfaction resulting from years of occupation. The first intifada was the result of grassroots social mobilization against daily restrictions on freedom and the lack of sovereignty, where a traffic accident became merely a trigger for mounting tensions.
Why did the military elimination of Palestinian organizations not end the conflict, and what did the intifada lead to?
The military elimination of organizations did not end the conflict because the source of resistance lay deeper than in the structures of specific organizations and stemmed from the structural problem of Palestinian statelessness. The intifada led to a transformation of the PLO toward pragmatism, manifested in the recognition of Israel's reality and the pursuit of a two-state solution.
Why did the peace model from the Egyptian-Israeli treaty not work in the case of the Palestinian conflict?
The treaty with Egypt concerned a classic interstate dispute over Sinai, whereas the Palestinian conflict is a weave of security, history, religion, and demographics. Additionally, this process is hindered by the presence of 'spoilers' on both sides and the fact that the more identity-based a conflict is, the harder it is to resolve.
Why did the Oslo and Madrid processes become possible only at the end of the 1980s, despite earlier diplomatic attempts?
These processes became possible due to the exhaustion of alternative methods of conflict resolution, such as armed struggle or military dominance, which made previous strategies too costly. Crucial were also the PLO's adoption of a two-state direction in 1988 and the change in global power dynamics associated with the end of the Cold War.
