Institutional and psychological conditions for peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in light of Benjamin Moser's thought

• • 🇵🇱 Polski

The article provides a critical analysis of the possibilities for ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, posing the thesis that lasting peace is not a matter of choosing a specific constitutional model—be it two states, one state, or a confederation—but rather building institutional predictability and restorative justice. The author argues that technical compromise projects often fail because they ignore psychological barriers, such as the pursuit of ontological security and entrenched narratives of existential threat. The key message of the text is the conviction that a real resolution to the dispute requires moving beyond zero-sum logic toward a model in which one community's right to self-determination and security is not realized at the expense of depriving the other side of those same rights. The analysis indicates that positive peace depends on the ability of both societies to recognize mutual traumas (multidirectional memory) and to replace strategies of domination with a system of legal and institutional guarantees that prevent the arbitrary violation of another human being's dignity.

Institutional and psychological conditions for peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in light of Benjamin Moser's thought

Introduction

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not merely a territorial dispute, but a profound institutional and psychological crisis. Lasting peace requires more than just drawing borders on a map.

The reader will discover why technical compromise blueprints often fail and what conditions are necessary to build stable coexistence. This analysis draws on Benjamin Moser's historical critique regarding the relationship between security and the right to self-determination.

Expanding the Space for Compromise via Regional Projects

To break the deadlock, attempts have been made to move beyond bilateral negotiations. An example is the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which proposed a comprehensive normalization of relations in exchange for the recognition of a Palestinian state.

In this context, the concept of non-zero-sum games proves particularly useful, as such an approach transforms a zero-sum game into a non-zero-sum game model. The territorial problem is thus embedded within a broader context of regional security and trade.

This allows for the costs of concessions to be offset by gains in other areas. Consequently, it expands the space for possible compromise by aligning the interests of multiple Middle Eastern states.

Expert Compromise Does Not Guarantee Social Acceptance

Detailed blueprints, such as the 2003 Geneva Initiative, offered technically sophisticated models for territorial division and compensation. Despite this, they were never implemented in practice.

The gap between the technical possibility of constructing a compromise and the capacity for its democratic adoption represents one of the most significant problems in conflict resolution theory; there is a chasm between expert-led compromise and social legitimacy. Leaders must engage in so-called two-level negotiations, balancing the demands of their foreign partner against those of their own society.

The primary obstacle consists of actors who sabotage the peace process, known as spoilers. Their actions ensure that even the most technically sound project remains unacceptable to citizens living in fear.

Challenges of Regional Normalization and Governance Models

The implementation of the two-state model faces barriers in the form of settlements and a lack of territorial contiguity. Regional normalization, such as the Abraham Accords, does not replace a Palestinian solution and may even weaken aspirations for self-determination.

Alternatives include a single democratic state model or a confederation (e.g., the 'A Land for All' project). A confederation combines sovereignty with joint resource management, allowing citizenship to be decoupled from place of residence.

The main barrier to a confederation is the asymmetry of power. Without mitigating disparities in resources and building institutional capacity, joint bodies may simply become tools for the stronger party's domination.

Summary

Lasting peace is not merely the absence of war (negative peace), but the construction of positive peace. This requires replacing strategies of domination with institutional predictability and restorative justice.

It is crucial to acknowledge mutual traumas through so-called multidirectional memory, where the tragedy of one group does not negate the suffering of the other. Without this, no governance structure can survive.

The moral value of a national project is revealed in its treatment of the Other. The right to protect one's own community ends where the systemic deprivation of another human being's freedom begins.

📚 Based on

Anti-Zionism A Jewish History

Doubleday
ISBN: 9780385551250

👤 About the book's author

Benjamin Moser

Benjamin Franzis Moser (born September 14, 1976) is an American author, biographer, essayist, and translator. Raised in Houston, Texas, he earned a bachelor's degree in history from Brown University and later completed a master's degree and doctorate at Utrecht University in the Netherlands. Moser achieved widespread recognition for his pioneering work 'Why This World: A Biography of Clarice Lispector' (2009), which was a finalist for the National Book Critics Circle Award and was instrumental in revitalizing international readership for the Ukrainian-Brazilian modernist writer. In 2020, he won the Pulitzer Prize for Biography for his comprehensive study 'Sontag: Her Life and Work' (2019). Formerly a columnist for Harper's Magazine and The New York Times Book Review, Moser has also published extensively on European and Latin American art, literature, and history.

Mind map: Institutional and Psychological Conditions for Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

📖 Glossary

Bezpieczeństwo ontologiczne
Potrzeba zachowania ciągłości obrazu samego siebie i swojego świata, co może prowadzić do trwania w konflikcie dla poczucia przewidywalności relacji.
Pokój pozytywny
Stan, który nie jest tylko brakiem wojny (pokój negatywny), ale obejmuje obecność sprawiedliwości społecznej i brak przemocy strukturalnej.
Negocjacje dwupoziomowe (Two-Level Games)
Koncepcja, w której liderzy muszą jednocześnie negocjować z partnerem zagranicznym oraz dążyć do akceptacji porozumienia przez własne społeczeństwo.
Gry o sumie niezerowej
Sytuacje w teorii gier, w których możliwe jest osiągnięcie korzyści przez obie strony jednocześnie (win-win), zamiast zysku jednej kosztem drugiej.
Spoilers (Podmioty sabotujące)
Aktorzy polityczni lub grupy, które dążą do uniemożliwienia realizacji porozumienia pokojowego poprzez działania dyplomatyczne lub przemocowe.
Sprawiedliwość przejściowa
Zbiór mechanizmów prawnych i społecznych służących rozliczeniu z przeszłością w celu umożliwienia pokojowego współistnienia po konflikcie.

Frequently Asked Questions

Which political projects have attempted to break the impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by moving beyond bilateral negotiations?
An example of such a project is the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which envisioned the normalization of relations between Arab states and Israel in exchange for withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 and the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Another significant undertaking was the Geneva Initiative of December 2003, presented by participants of unofficial negotiations.
Why have detailed peace projects, such as the Geneva Initiative, not been implemented in practice?
Detailed projects, such as the Geneva Initiative, were not implemented because they were merely compromise proposals rather than binding treaties. Their implementation would require profound political changes and social legitimacy, which are hindered by internal divisions and the actions of so-called 'spoilers'.
What are the real obstacles to implementing the two-state model, and can regional normalization replace it?
Real obstacles include issues of territorial continuity (including the separation of the West Bank and Gaza), the status of Jerusalem, the future of settlers, the right of return for refugees, and the creation of efficient infrastructure and security systems. Regional normalization is not an automatic solution to the conflict and may even weaken the political instruments serving Palestinian self-determination.
What are the alternative political models for resolving the conflict beyond the traditional division into two separate states?
Alternatives include the model of a single democratic state, ensuring equal civil rights for Jews and Palestinians regardless of identity, and a confederation. The confederal model assumes the creation of two sovereign states linked by common institutions in the areas of economy, security, and freedom of movement.
Is the confederal model a realistic solution, and what are the main barriers to its implementation?
The confederal model faces major barriers in the form of asymmetry in economic and military resources, which could lead to the dominance of the stronger party over common institutions. Additional obstacles include unresolved issues of ownership and restitution, as well as a low level of social acceptance for this solution.
Why do political solutions that theoretically seem preferred by societies encounter resistance or are considered impossible to implement in practice?
Resistance stems from the distinction between normative preference and feasibility assessment; a solution may be seen as the best but simultaneously impractical (e.g., due to settlement expansion). Additionally, the psychological weight of losses is often greater than potential gains, and persisting in the conflict can provide a sense of predictability and ontological security.
Why do mutual feelings of grievance and historical traumas hinder the achievement of a political agreement?
Mutual feelings of grievance create competing narratives of existential threat, in which every concession is perceived as a loss of identity or a denial of historical suffering. This leads to a situation where compromise is seen as unrealistic or threatening to the group's own security, and acknowledging the other side's suffering is treated as questioning one's own history.
Why is wanting it to happen not enough, and what mechanisms can realistically break the lack of trust between conflicting parties?
Wanting it to happen is not enough because a lack of trust and fear of future changes in the balance of power can make reaching an agreement impossible. Realistically breaking this state requires institutionally limiting uncertainty through monitoring mechanisms, independent dispute resolution, arms control, international guarantees, and the development of economic interdependence.
Are meetings and dialogues between Israelis and Palestinians alone sufficient to resolve the conflict?
Meetings and dialogues alone are not enough, as interpersonal contact is not a substitute for institutional reforms nor does it replace formal political negotiations. The effectiveness of such actions depends on the ability to transfer the results of dialogue to the level of the actual political process and to account for the deep asymmetry of power and economy.
What specific institutional and technical mechanisms are necessary to prevent a return to conflict after a ceasefire?
Institutions of rule of law and fair judiciary are essential, as they enable the individualization of responsibility for violations, preventing collective blame and the escalation of retaliation. It is also necessary to establish clear rules for the use of material resources and to create joint self-governing systems for managing critical infrastructure, such as water and energy management.
What institutional and social conditions are necessary for future Palestinian statehood to be stable and resistant to radicalization?
This requires building institutional capacity by creating a tax system, an independent judiciary, professional administration, and anti-corruption mechanisms. It is also crucial to ensure access to education, healthcare, and employment to reduce social vulnerability to radicalization.
How can the problem of territorial claims and historical grievances be resolved in a way that does not deepen the conflict?
Solving the problem requires combining restitution and financial compensation with forms of satisfaction, such as apologies, commemoration, and public recognition of the harm. It is crucial to apply the concept of multi-directional memory, which allows for the simultaneous recognition of the traumas of different groups without diminishing their experiences. It is also worth implementing educational programs that enable the confrontation of differing testimonies while maintaining standards of source criticism.
What is the difference between a simple ceasefire and a lasting resolution of a conflict in an institutional dimension?
A ceasefire limits the number of casualties and direct military actions, but it does not resolve the structural sources of the conflict. A lasting solution requires the establishment of positive peace, meaning the creation of institutional conditions for justice, equal legal standards, and security mechanisms based on predictability rather than dominance.
Is there a moral principle that would allow for the reconciliation of both sides' right to security and self-determination without resorting to violence?
Yes, this principle is the recognition that a community's right to security and self-determination cannot become a right to deprive others of these values. A proper understanding of security requires combining the right to protection with the obligation to respect the boundaries of coercion and the rejection of violence directed at civilians.

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