Introduction
This text analyzes the evolution of tech giants, who have transitioned from mere service providers to key players in global politics. This phenomenon, termed Techplomacy, is shifting the traditional balance of power between nation-states and business.
The reader will discover how control over digital infrastructure impacts national sovereignty and why the rivalry between the US and China for AI dominance is a struggle over a new civilizational order. You will also learn how to move from naive trust toward systemic technological accountability.
Tech Corporations as New Geopolitical Actors
Technology companies have acquired influence comparable to that of states thanks to their possession of functional infrastructural power. They do not possess territory, but they control the systems without which governments cannot function.
Cloud computing and AI serve as primary examples. When a corporation changes access protocols, it effectively modifies the living conditions of millions of citizens. This is a manifestation of structural power, where authority lies in shaping the frameworks within which others must operate.
In this way, code becomes law (code is law). These companies do not repeal statutes, but their technical decisions determine the practical implementation of fundamental rights, such as privacy and security.
Nodal Power and the Birth of Techplomacy
Control over critical network points creates so-called nodal power. States are becoming dependent on providers of operating systems or processors, which necessitates a new form of diplomacy.
In response, Denmark appointed the first technology ambassador. This signals that relations with Big Tech require a professional diplomatic apparatus rather than mere lobbying.
Such dependency creates an information asymmetry. States often do not fully understand the technologies they regulate (regulatory dependence), meaning that digital sovereignty depends on the ability to negotiate dependencies and maintain exit options (exit options).
Corporations as Operators of Political and Security Environments
Companies are assuming state functions, operating, for example, in the realm of cybersecurity. Through its Digital Crimes Unit, Microsoft neutralizes attacks, performing tasks that resemble intelligence or police operations.
This poses a risk to democracy, as private entities possess neither a democratic mandate nor public legitimacy. Their decisions are driven by corporate interest rather than the common good.
To prevent this, the constitutionalization of technology is necessary. Instead of relying on the ethics of engineers, we must build systems of accountability, oversight, and interoperability that preclude the arbitrary exercise of power over strategic infrastructure.
Summary
The rivalry between the US and China for AI dominance is a clash of two architectures: distributed innovation versus central coordination. At stake is whether humans will remain subjects or become objects of algorithmic optimization.
The highest form of maturity is not the creation of an infallible system, but one that designs the possibility of its own correction. Truly secure technology is that which, by its very architecture, does not require society to have blind faith in the intentions of its creators.
Frequently Asked Questions
9. How did big tech companies acquire influence comparable to state power?
10. Big tech companies acquired influence comparable to that of states thanks to their control over key digital infrastructure, upon which governments depend for communication, security, and data storage. They possess so-called functional infrastructural power (structural power), which allows them to shape the structures and protocols within which other entities operate.
How does control over digital infrastructure change the relationship between states and technology corporations?
Control over digital infrastructure creates so-called nodal power, giving corporations systemic importance and influence comparable to the power of states. This leads to a shift in diplomatic relations toward a multi-layered model, in which governments treat strategic tech companies as equal partners in foreign policy and security.
In what way are technology companies taking over state functions, and what threats to democracy does this dependency pose?
Technology companies take over state functions by becoming infrastructure operators and using civil law to perform tasks in the areas of public security, intelligence, or diplomacy. The threat to democracy is the lack of a democratic mandate and accountability mechanisms for corporations, as well as a deep asymmetry of knowledge and capability that makes the state dependent on entities driven by business goals rather than the public good.
How do technology corporations and states jointly shape standards of behavior in cyberspace before formal regulations are introduced?
Standards of behavior in cyberspace are shaped through multi-stakeholder governance initiatives that bring together governments, enterprises, and civil society. These coalitions produce norms before formal law is established, defining acceptable behaviors and building reputational expectations that may later permeate into state regulations.
Why should the expert knowledge of technology corporations not grant them the right to co-decide on citizens' rights, and how can states maintain sovereignty in this relationship?
The expert knowledge of corporations grants a right to be heard, but not to sovereignty, because companies represent their own interests rather than society, which should define the limits of interference with citizens' rights. States can maintain sovereignty through so-called 'sovereignty through optionality,' meaning the maintenance of the ability to choose and migrate between providers thanks to interoperability, open standards, and a real exit option.
How can the conflict between private technological power and the public mandate regarding the protection of human rights be resolved?
The solution is a synergy of state law, international sanctions, and corporate due diligence, based on the public accountability of companies. This model assumes cooperation in which enterprises provide technical competencies but do not assume the democratic mandate of the state nor independently define the common good.
How is technology changing diplomacy, and what fundamental differences in the approach to digital governance divide the USA and China?
Technology has become an element of geopolitics and a 'grammar of power,' requiring diplomats to possess competencies in areas such as AI, cybersecurity, and semiconductors. The USA and China share fundamental differences in the hierarchy of values and their approach to the relationship between the state, the individual, and the flow of information, which manifests in different ways of balancing individual autonomy against collective order and security.
How do the American and Chinese models of technological development differ, and how do both states combine innovation with control?
The American model is based on decentralized innovation and the free market, where the state intervenes selectively, whereas the Chinese model is centrally coordinated and subordinated to the strategic goals of the state. Both systems combine innovation with control: the USA builds a competitive internal ecosystem while simultaneously applying strict export restrictions on rivals, and China integrates market mechanisms with administrative direction of development.
What is the actual dynamics of the technological rivalry between the USA and China, and how do their approaches to AI governance differ?
The USA employs a dynamic strategy of limiting access to critical technologies, while simultaneously striving to maintain influence through China's dependence on the American ecosystem. China, on the other hand, is building its own AI infrastructure and treats it as a tool for both production and state governance. The difference in approach lies in the fact that the liberal tradition of the USA focuses on limiting public power over the individual, while the Chinese system prioritizes collective security and the public interest.
How do the American and Chinese models of risk management and control in the field of technology differ?
The American system focuses on controlling the boundaries of the ecosystem (e.g., exports, cybersecurity), leaving wide room for experimentation within the market. The Chinese system, however, embeds control directly within the ecosystem through platform obligations, data management, and strategic leadership of development.
Why is the USA-China rivalry in the field of AI more than just a race for a better model?
This rivalry is a clash over the entire complementary technological stack, as the advantage in AI results from the properties of the whole system (including semiconductors and data centers), rather than a single product. This leads to the risk of a 'Digital Iron Curtain,' meaning the separation of the entire ecosystems, standards, and infrastructure of both superpowers.
What determines the long-term advantage of superpowers in the technological race, and what are the risks associated with different innovation management models?
The long-term advantage of superpowers is determined by their capacity for civilizational learning—the ability to simultaneously create knowledge, fund risk, and correct their own mistakes. The risk of a centralized model is the scaling of errors made by the center, whereas a pluralistic system is prone to chaos, delays, and the blurring of responsibility.
Will the rivalry between the USA and China lead to a complete division of the world into two incompatible technological systems?
The rivalry between the USA and China is not leading to a full division, but rather to the emergence of a multi-layered geography of selective decoupling. Instead of total decoupling, a process of de-risking is occurring, in which technological globalization shifts its logic from optimizing efficiency to optimizing strategic resilience.
How does modern geopolitics utilize the structure of the chip supply chain to control the technological development of rivals?
Geopolitics utilizes so-called chokepoints—control over irreplaceable components of the supply chain, such as manufacturing equipment or design software. This allows states to regulate the pace of their rivals' technological development, treating export controls as a regulator for the flow of computing power or strategic resources.
How have global technological interconnections ceased to be an asset and instead become a tool of conflict between superpowers?
Global connections have created central network hubs that superpowers can use to monitor, block, or condition flows (so-called weaponized interdependence). As a result, the centralized network, once an asset, has become a strategic vulnerability and a tool of pressure in geopolitical rivalry.
How do technical standards and cloud infrastructure affect state sovereignty and geopolitics?
Technical standards influence geopolitics because dominant solutions create network effects and can exclude non-compliant products from the global market. Meanwhile, sovereignty in the cloud domain depends not only on server location but on operational, legal, and cryptographic control, as well as the ability to audit and migrate systems.
How do geopolitical divisions in AI infrastructure affect access to knowledge and the development of science?
Geopolitical divisions in AI infrastructure lead to the creation of distinct technological blocs, resulting in epistemic fragmentation and access to knowledge shaped by different cultural and legal norms. Restrictions on the flow of data, open-source tools, and talent may weaken scientific innovation, creating a paradox where the pursuit of security through closed systems reduces their cognitive productivity.
How do the material requirements for AI and local security decisions lead to a permanent technological divide in the world?
A digital iron curtain emerges cumulatively through a series of locally rational security decisions, such as restricting access to chips, cloud services, or production technologies. This process leads to the fragmentation of systems and the creation of separate supply chains and standards, which over time makes reintegration difficult due to massive investments in autonomous ecosystems.
Must a state possess its own technologies to be independent of technological superpowers?
A state does not need to possess its own technologies in full scope to maintain agency and independence; striving for total autarky is often economically unrealistic. Instead, it should aim for controlled interdependence through interoperability, using multiple providers, open standards, and building a portfolio of dependencies.
What are the costs and risks of complete technological decoupling between superpowers, and what strategy is better than full decoupling?
The costs of complete separation include the duplication of capital and knowledge, as well as the loss of global productivity and the ability to jointly solve existential problems. The risk is a less attractive ecosystem for scientists and investors and the creation of new vulnerabilities through autarky. A better strategy is selective decoupling while maintaining maximum interoperability in areas where the risk is acceptable.
Why is the ethics of engineers insufficient to safeguard human dignity in the face of powerful technologies, and what should replace it?
Engineering ethics are insufficient because modern technology has reached an institutional scale and affects the conditions for exercising freedom and the functioning of the world. It should be replaced by the constitutionalization of technological capability—that is, building systemic safeguards such as the separation of powers, external oversight, and limiting the concentration of power over tools.
Why can the optimization and speed of algorithms be dangerous for civil liberties, and how can this be countered?
The speed and optimization of algorithms can eliminate the space for dissent and transform the citizen into an object of behavioral optimization, leading to efficient arbitrariness. This can be countered by introducing intentional "friction" into digital systems and implementing data stewardship, which limits the power of the infrastructure provider in favor of client sovereignty.
Who bears responsibility for the errors of AI systems, and how can we prevent a situation where the complexity of technology absolves humans of blame?
Responsibility for AI errors lies with the human and the institution, as these systems are not moral agents. To prevent the blurring of guilt through technological complexity, continuous human attribution must be ensured in the implementation process, and a governance architecture must be created that allows for the reconstruction of decision sequences and operator intervention.
Why can the rapid deployment of technological innovations be dangerous for the individual and the functioning of democracy?
Rapid deployment of innovation is dangerous when it leads to irreversible harm in areas such as health, freedom, or the integrity of electoral processes. In the context of democracy, algorithmic content personalization can destroy the shared reality of citizens, hindering substantive debate and leading to the epistemic collapse of society.
How can we prevent a situation where an algorithmic profile of a person becomes their irrevocable destiny?
It is necessary to ensure contestability, so that humans can challenge algorithmic decisions, erroneous data, or classifications. Education building cognitive sovereignty is also key, as it allows for an understanding of the nature of AI models and provides a real capacity to oppose their results.
Why does the decrease in technical costs of implementing AI and surveillance force a change in legal and institutional norms?
The drop in technical costs lowers the barriers to abuses, such as total surveillance or mass profiling, which increases the scale of potential harm and the asymmetry between parties. Consequently, institutions must introduce stronger legal norms to effectively control actions that can now be carried out on a new, massive scale.
How can we prevent a situation where tech corporations become uncontrolled rulers of states' strategic infrastructure?
Efforts should be made to ensure system interoperability, which reduces structural dependence and allows states to change providers. It is also necessary to implement a polycentric governance model based on cooperation between states, science, enterprises, and civil society, so that political legitimacy remains within the public domain.
What specific principles and mechanisms should constitute systemic accountability for technology to ensure it does not become a tool beyond democratic control?
Systemic accountability requires the implementation of the doctrine of the responsible tool, based on ten pillars such as purposefulness, proportionality, power minimization, and public accountability. It is crucial to maintain democratic control over technology by repoliticizing hidden technical assumptions, so that society—and not just experts—defines the goals and limits of system interference.
What does the postulate of preserving humanity mean in a technological context, and what paths of civilization development result from it?
Preserving humanity means opposing the reduction of a human being to a set of data and maintaining their role as a subject who has the right to challenge decisions and is not merely an object of optimization. This leads to three paths of development: civic augmentation increasing human agency, administrative technocratism leading to loss of control over systems, and techno-political fragmentation based on competing national ecosystems.
Must the development of powerful technologies mean a loss of control over them, and how can the dictate of algorithms be prevented?
The development of powerful technologies does not have to mean a loss of control, as their trajectory is co-created by human decisions and institutions. To prevent the dictate of algorithms, systems should be designed to allow for self-correction, and procedures, constraints, and collective intelligence mechanisms should be implemented to distribute power among multiple actors.
What should technology look like if it is not to become a weapon against humans and democracy?
Technology should be designed so that it can be refused, its results questioned, and safely degraded in crisis conditions. It should increase access to knowledge and the capacity for cooperation, document its own operations without excessively documenting the human, and avoid transforming user dependence into a political monopoly.
