The limits of Big Tech power: the constitutionalization of private infrastructure using the example of Stijn Bronzwaer's Machine

• • 🇵🇱 Polski

The article analyzes the evolution of tech giants using Booking.com as an example, posing the thesis that the scale of Big Tech is not an inherent abuse, but rather an organizational success that nevertheless changes the ontology of the company from a market participant to its architect. The author argues that when a private platform becomes essential mediating infrastructure, its technical decisions (code) begin to function as law, creating a risk of transforming efficiency into uncontrolled sovereignty over information. The solution is not the administrative breakup of corporations nor blind faith in self-regulation, but the "constitutionalization" of private power through a polycentric system. Such a model, based on Elinor Ostrom's ideas and the concept of market contestability, aims to protect the real possibility of choice and ensure that the dominant player cannot close off the competitive procedures through which they once triumphed. The text sheds new light on DMA and DSA regulations, interpreting them not as punishment for success, but as a necessary safety fuse protecting the autonomy of users and entrepreneurs from the dictate of algorithmic architecture.

The limits of Big Tech power: the constitutionalization of private infrastructure using the example of Stijn Bronzwaer's Machine

Introduction

This text analyzes the evolution of tech giants using Booking.com as a case study. The author posits that the scale of Big Tech is not a failure, but rather an organizational success that transforms a company's role from a market participant into its architect.

The reader will discover why private code is becoming a form of law and how to protect user autonomy. The article proposes a model of constitutionalizing digital power instead of simply breaking up corporations.

Big Tech Scale as Success, Not Inherently Abuse

The market dominance of platforms like Booking.com is not automatic evidence of abuse. Size often results from genuine innovation and the reduction of transaction costs, which provides tangible value to the consumer.

The problem arises when a private organization becomes an essential intermediary infrastructure. At that point, business decisions begin to produce public consequences, transforming the company into a gatekeeper.

An example is Booking.com's status under the Digital Markets Act. These regulations do not punish success; rather, they introduce rules where scale creates a critical access point for the entire market.

Market Contestability as a Condition for Protecting Innovation

Technological success does not grant a platform the right to arbitrarily shape the rules of the game. A company that won thanks to an open market cannot now close off the very procedures that enabled its victory.

The key is market contestability. This means that new solutions must be able to enter the fray without the consent of the current leader. Without this, innovation is replaced by a system of rent-seeking.

Regulations such as the DMA counteract dependency by mandating data portability and banning self-preferencing. This protects the actual ability to choose an alternative, rather than just the formal possibility of closing an account.

Constitutionalizing Architectural Power Instead of Nationalizing Decisions

The regulation of giants should not involve taking over their product decisions, but rather the constitutionalization of private power. The law should define boundaries and procedures, not specific algorithms.

Platform power is primarily architectural power, where code functions as law. The boundary here is the prohibition of manipulation and protection against dark patterns that exploit information asymmetry against the user.

Responsibility for AI and algorithmic decisions rests with the organization as the process owner. The solution is a polycentric system in which oversight is provided by courts, auditors, and regulators to prevent digital sovereignty.

Summary

The victory of Big Tech begins with convenience, but civilizational maturity requires that we do not confuse it with freedom. Technological advantage cannot be a mandate to rule over others.

The final conclusion is the need to build institutions as adaptive as the technologies themselves. We must maintain a balance between efficiency and human autonomy, ensuring that the individual is not merely a conversion record.

📚 Based on

The Machine
()
NRC
ISBN: 9789083629605

👤 About the book's author

Stijn Bronzwaer

NRC

Stijn Bronzwaer (born 1981 in Heerlen, Netherlands) is a Dutch investigative journalist and non-fiction author. He studied communication science at Radboud University and completed journalism training at Utrecht University and the University of Amsterdam. In 2007, he joined the Dutch national newspaper NRC, where he worked as a business reporter, media desk editor, and deputy editor-in-chief between 2016 and 2019, during which period he co-founded the daily podcast NRC Vandaag. Since 2019, Bronzwaer has covered technology, corporate culture, startups, and artificial intelligence for NRC. He is widely recognized for his in-depth corporate investigations co-authored with colleagues Merijn Rengers and Joris Kooiman, notably the critically acclaimed work on Booking.com, which won the 2022 De Loep prize for investigative journalism.

Mind map: The Limits of Big Tech Power: Constitutionalizing Infrastructure

📖 Glossary

Gatekeeper
Podmiot świadczący podstawową usługę platformową, który posiada znaczącą władzę rynkową i służy jako wąskie gardło między biznesem a konsumentami.
Kontestowalność rynku
Zdolność rynku do bycia zakwestionowanym przez nowych konkurentów bez konieczności uzyskiwania zgody od obecnego lidera.
Policentryzm
System zarządzania, w którym władza i decyzje są rozproszone między wiele niezależnych ośrodków zamiast spoczywać w jednym centrum.
Władza architektoniczna
Zdolność do kształtowania zachowań użytkowników poprzez projektowanie technicznej struktury systemu (kodu), która określa, co jest możliwe do zrobienia.
Self-preferencing
Praktyka platformy polegająca na faworyzowaniu własnych produktów lub usług w wynikach wyszukiwania kosztem zewnętrznych konkurentów.
Koszty transakcyjne
Wydatki i wysiłek związane z poszukiwaniem informacji, negocjacjami i zawieraniem umów na rynku.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does the immense scale and market dominance of platforms such as Booking.com automatically prove an abuse of power?
No, the size of an enterprise is not synonymous with the abuse of power. Holding a dominant market position and economic power does not in itself constitute a violation of the law, and competitive advantage may result from innovation, efficiency, and consumer trust.
Why does the technological success of a platform not give it the right to arbitrarily shape the rules of the game in the market?
The owner of digital infrastructure cannot automatically derive from the ownership rights of the code the authority to arbitrarily shape the terms of other participants' entry into the market. The platform should have the right to enjoy the fruits of its victory, but it cannot close off the competitive process through which it was able to achieve success itself.
How can tech giants be regulated so as not to destroy their efficiency while simultaneously limiting their excessive power?
The regulation of tech giants should consist of the constitutionalization of their private infrastructural power, rather than the nationalization of product decisions. Instead of imposing specific technical solutions, the law should define the competencies, procedures, and boundaries of platform operations, paying particular attention to the truthfulness and integrity of information within the choice architecture.
How do regulations such as the DMA counteract the dependence of users and companies on dominant digital platforms?
Regulations such as the DMA counteract dependence by forcing increased access to data, which reduces switching costs and enables the actual transfer of history and reputation. Additionally, they limit practices of self-preferencing, tying, and bundling, which could be used to leverage a dominant position in one area to close off adjacent markets.
What specific boundaries should limit the power of Big Tech, and how should they be controlled so as not to stifle innovation?
Big Tech's power should be limited by boundaries regarding data minimization, algorithmic accountability (focused on goals and effects rather than code), the right to human judgment within an organization, and responsibility for the external effects of scale. Control should be based on polycentricity—a system of mutual corrections including competition, audits, courts, and regulators. To avoid stifling innovation, a distinction must be made between errors resulting from honest experimentation and the conscious exploitation of asymmetry or the ignoring of risks.
Why is the formal possibility of opting out of Big Tech services not enough to consider their power safe?
The formal possibility of opting out of Big Tech services is insufficient because network effects and dependency structures make the cost of such a decision economically unrealistic. There is a difference between formal freedom and real freedom, where the theoretical availability of alternatives does not guarantee the actual ability to choose a different path.
Why can the complete removal of barriers (frictionless experience) in digital services be dangerous for the user?
The complete removal of barriers can lead to situations where the user reacts to system suggestions immediately and without reflection, which threatens their autonomy of choice. The lack of such mechanisms promotes a dangerous concentration of power among digital platforms and increases the risk of manipulation at the expense of conscious decision-making.
Who bears responsibility for decisions made by algorithms and AI agents in large organizations?
Responsibility for algorithmic decisions lies with the organization that designs the system's goals, selects the data, and establishes oversight procedures. Within organizational governance, responsibility should be assigned not only to the implementer but primarily to the process owner and the body capable of changing the rules.
Where is the line between acceptable market success for Big Tech and unacceptable abuse of infrastructural power?
This line does not depend on the size of the company, but rather revolves around the reproduction of power by closing off the process of competition and choice. Big Tech can be large and profitable; however, it is unacceptable to use this position to prevent others from attempting to succeed or to block alternatives.
Why doesn't the technological success of a market leader have to mean the end of competition, and what should the control over such power look like?
The success of a market leader does not have to mean the end of competition as long as participants retain a real right to leave and alternatives exist. Control over such power should consist of preventing the blocking of others' successes and ensuring an open space for new innovations and future competitors.
What is the proper goal of Big Tech regulation, and what does the history of Booking.com teach us in the context of digital power?
The goal of Big Tech regulation is to maintain a balance of mutual dependencies within the digital network, so that no single entity gains uncontrolled sovereignty and multiple independent centers of experimentation are preserved. The history of Booking.com teaches us that modern digital power is a network of dependencies, and a simple innovation can transform into a global system of control and distribution.
What is the final conclusion from the analysis of Big Tech's success, and what should the relationship between technology and human freedom look like?
Big Tech can create powerful tools and profit from them, but technical efficiency does not grant it the right to unlimited power over information and choice. The relationship between technology and freedom should be based on treating machines as tools that reduce chaos, yet do not strip humans of their autonomy or the right to define their own goals.

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